

US Responsibilities of Cheju Massacres 1947-1949 Revisited¹

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Abstract

The seed of the grand tragedy, the Cheju Massacres (1947-1954) were crawling about to pop. Is it the path of unification and peace? Is it the road to division or war? Koreans were wandering in front of a forked road. The date of April 5, 1948, after the very day of Cheju April 3rd, 1948 Popular Uprising, the Commander of the United States Army Command in Korea, General Hodge issued a decree on human rights.” However, the U.S. military did not abide by any decree on human rights in the three years of US occupation in South Korea.

The U.S. Army military officers who had been sent to Cheju from the main land, South Korea in the date of March 1st, 1947, to order, command, control and communicate the uncompromising hard-line anti-communist operation continued until the Cheju people were considered enemies and were destroyed in accordance with the Field Manual of US Army. So they did not distinguish civilians from guerrillas, and did not distinguish the armed forces of the guerillas from the unarmed refugees, innocent ordinary people. It was only a plan and implementation of a super hard-line suppression operation. It is the biggest reason that the U.S. military should be responsible for the Cheju massacres.

Key words :

U.S Responsibilities of Cheju Massacres, April 3rd Uprising, Cheju Massacres(1947-1954), Reparations, Transitional Justice


1) This paper was first presented in the International Conference, “Jeju April 3rd(4·3) Reconciliation Conference 2018 in Chicago : Jeju 4·3 Grand Tragedy, Testimony and Tolerance” at the University of Chicago, April 17, 2018. I really appreciated it Professors Bruce Cummings for providing useful discussions, Chang Hoon Ko and Kunihiro Yoshida helped me create opportunities for my presentation. I am also grateful to all those who accompanied this Jeju Transitional Justice Initiatives.

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Why United States of America has been silent for 72 years

Cheju Massacres are the international case for international human rights law. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now Russia) Army divided the Korean Peninsula and occupied directly after surrender of Japanese occupation, August, 1945. The peaceful and beautiful Cheju Island, South Korea under dominated by the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) from September 1945, through August 1948 to June 1949.

The Cheju massacres took March 1st, 1947 to September 24th, 1954. Cheju Island was control and ruled by the USAMGIK from November 9, 1945 following the end of the World War II and the Imperial Japanese Army's enforced occupation of Korea in August 15, 1945. These grand tragic events were a period when South Korea was occupied by the US Army Force in Korea (USAFIK), and the US Military Advisory Group to South Korea (K MAG) was exercising the operational control over the Army, Navy and National Police of Republic of Korea, she was established on August 15, 1948. Even though around thirty thousand to sixty thousand (30,000-60,000) non-armed and innocent Cheju civilians lost their lives during this period, the US federal government have made no comments, any recognition, apology, responsibility and reparation on these tragic events for the last 71 years.³



According to the official Investigation report released by the South Korean government in 2003, 859 people were reported killed from March 1, 1947 to August 1948 to the Cheju Provincial Council. It was a peace time when the USAMGIK ruled South Korea directly. The victims were reported to be 153 in September 1948, 804 in October, 2,205 in November, and 2,974 in December 1948. Then it was reported that the 2,240 in January 1949, 671 in February, 361 in March, 221 in April, 156 in May, and 117 in June 1949. It was a time when the U.S. Forces of USAFIK and KMAG led the South Korean military and police forces, and controlled all of the fighting operations. From March 1947 to June 1949, 10,761 people were reported killed.⁴ If you look at the distribution of victims by village, you can see that they were extensively slaughtered throughout Cheju Island.⁵

<Table 1> Number of Victims by Village

Buk jeju gun	Jejueup 3,890	Geonip 62	Naedo 17	Nohyeong 512	Donam 42	Dodu 264	Doryeon 180	Do pyeong 151
		Bonggae 280	Samdo 73	Samyang 236	Ara 197	Yeondong 107	Yeong pyeon 112g	Other 1
		Odeung 91	Ora 247	Oedo 84	Yeonggang 145	Yeong dam 57	Wolpyang 75	Ido 66
		Iho 368	Ildo 39	Haaan 71	Hwabuk 297	Huicheon 117		
	Aeowl myeon 1,501	Gonae 35	Goseong 86	Gwakji 23	Gwang nyeong 168	Gueom 36	Geumdeok 114	Geum seong 7
		Napeup 67	Sangga 46	Sanggwii 73	Sogil 68	Susan 75	Sineom 48	Aeowl 59
		Eodo 132	Eoeum 59	Jangeon 99	Haga 43	Hagwi 259	Other 1	
	Hallim myeon 1,043	Geumsan 5	Gwideok 90	Geumneung 16	Geumdeung 4	Geumak 147	Nakcheon 37	Daerim 24
		Dongmyeong 52	Dumo 22	Myungwol 141	Sangdae 12	Sang myung 56	Suwon 17	Sin chang 3
		Ongpo 1	Yeongsu 22	Wolnyeong 1	Wolrim 2	Jeoji 116	Josu 52	Cheong su 100
		Panpo 16	Hallim 61	Heopjae 17				
	Jocheon myeon 1,841	Gyoraee 53	Daeheul 125	Bukchon 462	Seonheul 208	Sinchon 220	Sinheung 99	Wasan 82
Waheul 101		Jocheon 219	Hamdeok 268					
Gujwa myeon 910	Gimnyeong 47	Deok cheon 21	Dongbuk 138	Sangdo 49	Sehwa 63	Songdang 76	Yeon pyeong 5	
	Woljeong 45	Jongdal 107	Pyeongdae 39	Hado 165	Handong 35	Haengwon 115	other 5	

3) Some scholars studied the US responsibilities of the Cheju massacres. For example, Hur Sang Soo(1988), Kwang Sung Song(1989), Bruce Cummings(1998), Chang Hoon Ko(2004), Eric K. Yamamoto and et al.(2012), Tae-Ung Baik(2012), Kunihiko Yoshida(2012), Hun Joon Kim(2014), George Katsiaficas(2015) and others many Koreans made such claims. For example, you can find it on YouTube. "US and South Korea Responsibility for the "Peacetime" Jeju April 3rd Grand Massacre" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tT-7KUQLM4&t=1685s>

4) The facts about the Cheju massacres were based on an official report of The National Committee on Discovering Truth on Jeju 4·3 Incident and Restoration of Honor of Victims 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report. I would like to express my gratitude to all the people involved in these investigations. The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incidents 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report. p. 460.
5) Id. 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report. p. 461.

4,756	Seogwi myeon 544	Dongheung 44	Beop hwan 14	Bomok 2	Sanghyo 41	Seogwi 66	Seoho 20	Seo hong 140
		Sinhyo 27	Top yeong 87	Hahyo 38	Hogeun 64	Other 1		
	Jungmun myeon 739	Gangjeong 197	Daepo 37	Dosun 57	Sangye 41	Saekdal 64	Yeongnam 52	Wol pyeong 14
		Jungmun 108	Haye 37	Hawon 50	Hoisu 37	Other 1		
	Andeok myeon 785	Gamsan	Gwang pyeong	Deoksu	Donggwang	Sagye	Sangchang	Sang cheon
		89	50	38	205	32	98	70
		Seogwang	Chan gcheon	Hwasun	Other			
	Daejeong myeon 600	Gapa 13	Gueok 13	Dongil 46	Mureung 67	Boseong 38	Sangmo 52	Sindo 59
		Sinpyeong 78	Anseong 38	Yeongrak 37	Inseong 30	Ilgwa 43	Hamo 86	
	Namwon myeon 914	Namwon 97	Sumang 104	Sinrye 78	Sinheung 102	Wimi 40	Uigwi 255	Tae heung 97
		Haye 32	Hanam 109					
	Pyoseon myeon 725	Gasi 419	Seong eup 76	Sehwa 46	Tosan 172	Pyoseon 8	Hacheon 4	
	Seongsan myeon 449	Goseong 62	Nansan 102	Samdal 13	Seongsan 16	Susan 125	Siheung 13	Sinsan 14
		Sinyang 13	Sincheon 1	Sinpung 23	Ojo 52	Onpyeong 15		
A total of 14,028 persons was reported as the victims including 87 persons whose hometown addresses could not be identified.								

The most crucial issue to be considered in deciding whether a set of fact constitutes crimes against humanity is the contextual element thereof. This contextual element of crimes against humanity means a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.⁶

Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, 24th Corps, US Army became commander of the USAFIK, Commanding General of U.S. Occupation Forces in Korea on 27 August 1945 under by General Douglas MacArthur the Commanding General, General Headquarter, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers–Far East Command under by US President, Harry Truman. The President of the United States is the military's overall head.⁷ On August 13th 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated American five-star General Douglas MacArthur to receive the surrender of Japanese forces in those areas for which the

United States was responsible, including the southern half of Korea.⁸ President Truman gave him of special mission. "You may exercise your authority as you feel fit to carry out your duties. Our relationship with Japan is not based on any contract, but on their unconditional surrender. The powers of your authority are supreme."⁹

General MacArthur issued a proclamation to the people of Korea on September 7th 1945 establishing American military occupation, domination and control over all Korea south of the 38th Parallel. "Having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent," he declared, "the Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the Instrument of Surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights. In giving effect to these purposes, your active aid and compliance are required.... All persons will obey promptly all my orders and orders issued under my authority. Acts of resistance to the occupying forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety will be punished severely."¹⁰ They were an absolute power to Korean people. As revealed in this Proclamation(布告) sentence, General MacArthur defined the character of the US Army Force as an occupation of South Korea and treated Koreans as if they were enemies of the enemy. This attitude toward Koreans was not limited to Gen. MacArthur. Soon after arriving in South Korea, General Hodge did not try to hide his disdainful attitude toward Koreans by saying "Koreans are the same cats as Japanese".¹¹

Therefore USAMGIK was established on the solely legal base of military occupation in accordance with the Hague Regulation in 1907 and it had the character and function of the military occupant regulated in the Hague Regulation. USAMGIK was also established as a military government at the unusual situation of the Korean history after its liberation from Imperial Japan in 1945 and has taken the responsibility and the authority of the de facto

6) KIM Sangkul 2016 On Contextual Element of Crimes Against Humanity –kukjebeobhakhoe –nonchong (Journal of International Law Association) Vol. 61 No.1(Korean).

7) The National Security Act of 1947, adopted following World War II and during the Cold War's onset, created the modern U.S. military framework; the Act merged previously Cabinet-level Department of War and the Department of the Navy into the National Military Establishment (renamed the Department of Defense in 1949), headed by the Secretary of Defense; and created the Department of the Air Force and National Security Council. United States Armed Forces – en.wikipedia.org.

8) GHQ, United States Army Military Government in Korea, Statistical Research Division, History of the United States Army Military Government in Korea, Period of September 1945–30 June 1946, 3 vols. (hereafter cited as History of USAMGIK), I, 22–23, copy in OCMH. (2) WD GO No. 1, 13 Aug. 1945.

9) Clark Lee and Richard Heschel 1952 Douglas MacArthur Henry Holt and Company p. 184; John Gunther 1950 The Riddle of MacArthur Harper & Brothers p. 125.

10) Proclamation No. 1 by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Foreign Relations of the United States, hereafter FRUS, 1945, vol. VI. pp. 1043~1044.

11) James I. Matray, 1985 The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941~1950. University of Hawaii Press.p.53.

government in South Korea.¹²

General MacArthur acknowledged the full authority of General Hodge when Gen. Hodge asked Gen. MacArthur to comment on the South Korean occupation and Korea's future issues in November 25, 1945:

"Do your best to judge what action to take. I did not fully aware of the situation in the area to adequately action, but any decision you make on this matter will support it."¹³

In early November 1945 General Marshall instructed General MacArthur to prepare plans for raising a police-type force in Korea as the first step toward reducing the number of U.S. troops in the country. General Hodge appointed Dr. Cho Byung Ok as the Commissioner of the National Police Agency, as of October 21, 1945 who was educated in Columbia University, New York. On November 28, 1945 General MacArthur reported plans for creating a Korean national police force of 25,000 by 1 January 1946, and asked permission to use surplus U.S. arms for this force. He pointed out at the same time that it might be advisable to set up a complete Korean national defense force.¹⁴

On August 1st 1946, during the rule of the US Army Military Government in Korea, Cheju Island became an independent province, separated from Chonnam Province. Cheju was raised from an island to become the ninth province of Korea. That is why was for divide and rule of the direct occupation policy by US Army Force in Korea after the formation of 9th Regiment and increase the power of police in Cheju Island under by USAMGIK.

Headquarters of USAFIK reported G-2 Periodic Report, G-2 Weekly Summary, G-3 Operation Report, and G-3 Weekly Operation Report from 6th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division, USAFIK including 9th Regiment Cheju-Do Daily Reports, Counter Intelligence Corps Weekly Activities, Semi-Monthly Report and Monthly Report of 971 CIC,

USAFIK with well-organized form in the bureaucratic system all of the South Korea. This is why the U.S. military had a strong grip on the nation's mail and communication networks, transport networks, and information gathering networks with world-class wireless communications equipment and the best intelligence capacities with persons and technologies.

As the first talks of the US-Soviet Joint Commission broke down in May 1946, the leadership of the right-wing camp in Seoul began to split into three. Right-wing leaders, with Syng-man Rhee as the central figure, wanted to set up a separate independent government in South Korea excluding their northern counterparts. Rhee spoke in Jeongeup, Chonbuk on June 3, 1946 that South Korea should set up an independent committee only. He was a political machine that had set up a divide and separate government in South Korea and was only interested in winning power. The other movement led by Kim Gyu-sik and his followers was about cooperating with the left-wing forces. The Moderates like Kim Gyup-sik who want to join the left and right alliance organized by the U.S. military government sought to form a partnership with the Lyuh Woon Hyung's faction in the progressive camp.¹⁵ The third was Kim Koo's faction, which wanted to maintain the anti-trusteeship stance but was sandwiched between the former two positions. Even though they had cooperated over the issue of the anti-trusteeship movement and the establishment of the National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence, Syng-man Rhee and Kim Koo became estranged about this time.¹⁶ However, in Cheju, the circumstances around the trusteehip unfolded in a different way from on the mainland.¹⁷

The first tragic and disgrace event, Gwandeokjeong Plaza Massacre, central part of Cheju-eup(now city) in modern Cheju, Korean history took place in March 1st 1947, the 28th March 1st 1919 Independence Declaration Movement Day.

12) Bruce Cumings, 1998 "The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Cheju-do Uprising" in the lecture presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the April 3, 1948 Cheju-do Events, Tokyo, March 14, 1998.; Lee Johnson 2017 A Review of the International Law on the US Army Military Government in Korea after her Liberation in 1945-Focused on the Korean statehood and Cheju April 3rd(4.3) Incidents- Kukjebeobhakhoeononchong (Journal of International Law Association) Vol. 62 No.2(Korean)

13) "Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo" (25 November 1945), FRUS, 1945 vol. VI. pp. 1133-1134; General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul" (25 November 1945), FRUS, 1945 vol. VI. p. 1134.

14) Rad, CM-OUT 80645, Marshall to MacArthur, 3 Nov. 1945. (2) Rad, CM-IN 9260, CINCAFPAC to WD, 28 Nov. 45.

15) On July 19, 1947, Lyuh Woon Hyung was assassinated in Seoul by a 19-year-old man named Han Chigeun, a refugee from North Korea and an active member of a extremist right-wing group, secret society for White Terror "Baek-ui-sa", at the Hyehwa-dong Rotary road, Seoul.

16) Lee Wan-Bum 1987, "Issues of the Trusteeship on the Korean Peninsula," Understanding of History before and after the Liberation (Korean), Vol. III, Hangilsa. p. 265.

17) Id. 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report. Original Korean Version (2003) The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incidents. p. 110.

Gwandeokjeong Massacre

The armed policemen under by the USAMGIK from the main land mistook the swarming crowd and shooting without any warning signals. Six spectating civilians after the demonstrators passed the Gwandeokjeong Plaza in the front of 1st District Police Station were killed and another six people were injured because of this direct shooting. Among the victims were an elementary school student and a woman in her twenties holding an infant. The list of the victims is as follows: Huh Du-yong (age 15, the fifth-grade of Cheju North Elementary School student), Park Jae-ok (age 21, woman), Oh Mun-su (age 34), Kim Tae-jin (age 38), Yang Mu-bong (age 49) and Song Deok-su (age 49).¹⁸ On the same day, there was a second shooting incident in front of the Cheju provincial hospital which again demonstrated how agitated the policemen from the police reserves were. However, the National police of USAMGIK did not even investigate the situation accurately and blamed the Cheju residents for everything. The police didn't apologize at all. Rather, the police of USAMGIK have branded it as a result of the communists' agitation.

British Army soldier shot and killed five American people while attack under by a mob in March 5, 1770, on King Street, Boston. The tensions that led to the Boston Massacre were the product of the occupation of Boston by Redcoats in 1768. Widely publicized, it contributed to the unpopularity of the British regime in much of North America in the years before the American Revolution.¹⁹

US Army Major Stout, who was in charge of USAMGIK in Cheju, stated his views on this issue, saying "The shooting incident in front of Gwandeokjeong Plaza happened because the policemen mistook the situation in which the crowd chased the policeman, who hit the child accidentally, for an attack on the police station. As revealed later, the crowd was not carrying anything like clubs but only placards made of bamboo."²⁰

Cheju Island has a long history of relatively powerful Cheju chapter of People's Committee activities comparing with other region, ranging from the administrative vacuum made before the liberation to the one created before the occupation of the USAFIK.

There has been no major conflicts between the Cheju People's Committee and the U.S. Army in Cheju till the Gwandeokjeong Massacre happen suddenly. Until then, no conflicts between the left and right wings or political ideologies emerged in Cheju as elsewhere. The March 1st Independence Declaration ceremonies were also held by all Cheju islanders. Cheju Islanders did not participate or engage in the general strike in September 1946 or in the October 1946 uprising in Taegu. There were no major ideological divisions among Cheju residents as yet.

All the progressive, nationalist, socio-democrat, socialist, communist, and middle liners members of Cheju Island gathered around the Cheju chapter of People's Committee which autonomous popular organization established on September 25, 1945 to form the Cheju chapter of Democratic People's Front in February 23, 1947. In this organization, famous anti-Japanese patriot for national liberation and independence all the life contributed who chairperson of Cheju chapter of South Korea Labor Party(SKLP) now, Buddhist monk and Cheju Middle school principal also participated as representatives. With the focus of this Cheju chapter of Democratic People's Front at the center, all progressive conscience groups, except for the national dissentionists, traitors, and pro-Japanese collaborators, gathered to prepare and performed the March 1947 Declaration of Independence Ceremony. But after the legal anniversary meeting was over and the demonstrators marched past it, the shooting took place by the U.S. Military Government police, which led to the massacre of Gwandeokjeong.

The police under by USAMGIK imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew from the evening of the very day of the shooting and Gwandeokjeong Massacre. The curfew began at 7 p.m. and ended at 6 a.m. the next day. Angers and grieves from the below were spread in all hearts of the Cheju islanders rapidly.

The U.S. military occupation policy was seen as a failure by Koreans, retaining the position for the former Korean officials who engaged in pro-Japanese administrative and police activities. While the US military government in South Korea has switched from a controlled economy policy during the Japanese colonial era to a free market economy like American style, the living conditions have gotten worse in the market due to the price hike such as rice prices. Some profiteer, which are linked with the police and officials under by USAMGIK, accumulated goods by smuggling. Many people died from the epidemic

18) Jeju Province, History of Jeju Province, p.72. in ID. 2013 The Jeju 4-3 Incidents Investigation Report . p. 133.

19) <https://www.britannica.com/place/Boston/Cultural-life#ref312785>.

20) Dokrip Shinbo(Korean), April 5, 1947.

called cholera in Cheju Island. Most of all, the U.S.-led joint trusteeship rule and the US-USSR Joint Commission for New Korea negotiation in the Korean Peninsula did not go well. Popular sentiments in the South Korean were turning to despair and disgust as it recognized the identity of its occupation forces from the hopes and expectations of U.S. troops who had expressed as a Liberation Army.

Stigmatization

Cheju islands were stigmatized as a red, commie in a night by the Commissioner of National Police under USAMGIK. The United States president Truman announced a doctrine to support the anti-communist activists in the Greek Civil War in March 1947. The anti-Communist doctrine by U.S. president Truman was directly, widely, organizationally and systematically reflected in the remarks, actions and behaviors of U.S. troops stationed overseas. Any persons, groups or political parties with a different thoughts, opinions or ideologies from the US president were rejected, excluded and exterminated as a Communist. The elimination and exclusion for the others with American's position and policy has been established and implemented. The politics of exclusion and elimination was carried out in earnest rather than the politics of integration and inclusion.

General MacArthur, General Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Powers-Far Eastern Command in Tokyo, Japan had a different position with President Truman in many respects, but the anti-communist position was the same as that of communism, which had to be regarded as the destroyed and exterminated. These extremist anti-communism stances were the same for General Hodge, Cho Byung Ok, and Syng Man Rhee, who later assumed the post of President of Republic of Korea. These extremist anti-communists viewed and treated everybody as a communist if they opposed their claims or policies. To this end, they labeled such opponents and dissidents as communists. So their anti-communists isolate and alienate the opponents from the societies.

Beginning to crush the widespread public and civilian general strike protesting the Gwandeokjeong Massacre, Cho Byung Ok declared Cheju Island as a communist Moscow and is not marked for removal. Cho Byung Ok and pro-Japanese police officers

stigmatized the SKLP members and Cheju islanders as a communist to divide and rule the masses, isolate, destroy, eliminate, and exterminate the so called communist including SKLP members.

Right after the Gwandeokjeong Massacre (3 · 1 Shooting Incident), USAMGIK kept an eye on the situation in Cheju. The USAFIK and USAMGIK jointly set up an investigation team and dispatched it to Jeju on 8 March. The head of the team was Colonel James A. Casteel.²¹ The US military has recognized the seriousness of the Gwandeokjeong Massacre in Cheju Island and set out to investigate the truth on a large scale.

The Cheju joint public-private general strike, which began on 10 March, tailed off around 20 March. A US Army intelligence periodic report said, "A report received on 19 March, states that 90% of the striking Military Government employees and 50% of the transportation employees have returned to work on the island province; the situation is reported as quiet."²²

Even Colonel Casteel didn't leave any announcement when he left Jeju on 13 March. Furthermore, Cheju Military Governor Stout who had said he would announce the results of the investigation as soon as possible was tight-lipped about it.²³

The implementation of the U.S. military government made secrecy justifiable. But Hodge's secrecy extends far beyond the boundaries of reasonable patience. Let's hear Richard Robinson's comments on this type of secrecy.

"In the South Korea, any criticism of the U.S. military government was regarded as a rebellion against the authorities. I heard Gen. Hodge, commander of the USAFIK command speak to his staff directly. A consistent policy in the debate was that the military information that seemed to be subject to criticism should be covered up as much as possible by the use of classified documents. The man who made these mistakes was severely disciplined. If fact can be found out, it can be said that the incompetent and corrupt administration in the name of American democracy has messed up the United States' South Korea occupation policy

21) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 479, March 13, 1947; Jeju Shinbo(Korean), March 12, 1947.

22) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 483, March 19, 1947.

23) Id. 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report . p. 146.

incredibly ...”²⁴ Richard Router-Back, a journalist who covered South Korea during the U.S. military occupation, also pointed out the secrecy of the U.S. military government and General Hodge.²⁵

Red Purge Policy of US Army Force

The analysis of intelligence report of 24th Corps, USAFIK says, “the general strike is believed to be Communist-inspired, but was participated in by both Left and Right as a protest against the killing of six persons and the wounding of six others during unauthorized demonstration and rioting on 01 March in CHEJU City.”²⁶ The beginning and end of all events were unfairly assumed to be due to communists or leftists as an enemy of the United States.²⁷ Among the detainees were senior chief of the military government in Cheju, teachers, police officers, and social group executives. The chairman of the Cheju Provincial Strike Struggle Committee, was also included. He was the director of the Cheju Provincial Office of Industrial Affairs, who will serve as the governor of Cheju since May, 1948, after the April 3rd Popular Uprising. As such, forced detainees were indiscriminate and irregular, regardless of their political orientation or group affiliation.

The military government trials of the accomplices of the Gwandeokjeong Massacre(3 · 1 shooting incident by police) and the 3 · 10 General Strike began from 3 April 1947 in Cheju. The first hearing was held at the Cheju district court. Captain Samuel J. Stevenson, judge advocate of the Cheju military government, was a chief judge and Captain Partridge joined the trials as a prosecuting attorney. On April 10, the Jeju police inspection agency made an

announcement that 260 people out of 500 people under arrest had been or would be forwarded to the trials –199 people had already been sent to the trials and 61 people would be forwarded to them.²⁸ After the 3 · 1 Massacre, there were many cases of clashes between the people and the police. With the Udo incident and the Jungmun Village incident in March 1947(injured eight people) as a starting point, the Jongdal Village incident occurred in June (three policemen were attacked) and the Bukchon Village incident happened in August. These incidents occurred and more than 80 residents were arrested and referred to trial. The U.S. military government did not adopt a peaceful method of resolving the issues raised in the Cheju islanders. There were clashed between officials of USAMGIK and the people.

There was the commander of the 9th Regiment of the Korea Constabulary in Moseolpo, but he could not influence current affairs because it had not been long since the establishment of the regiment. Five heads of the Cheju military government including the commander of the 9th regiment were replaced with new faces after the 3 · 1 Shooting Incident. The Sweeping Reshuffle of Personnel within the Military Government was necessary for a peaceful settlement of the situation. However, the contents of the personnel change were the opposite of the correct solution. Lieutenant Colonel Russel D. Barros, the new Cheju Provincial Military governor, was an anti-communist who warned him to be careful because the left wing of Cheju Island was strong. In the U.S. military intelligence report, new Cheju governor was considered an extreme rightist (a right-wing anti-communist).²⁹ They all had one thing in common: they were anti-communists, and they could do anything to exclude communism. Advisor to the police, Captain Partridge, who had played an important role in developing the Cheju Police, was also replaced with a new face in June 1947. He was there Gwandeokjeong Massacre at that time.

On March 28, 1947, at the conference between Syng-man Rhee and Mr. Draper, Under Secretary, Rhee said, “I’ve heard that the USA might have an intention to build a naval base on Cheju Island” and added, “If the Korean government is established, I’m sure that the Korean people will willingly let the USA construct a permanent base on Cheju Island.”³⁰ It

24) Richard Robinson 1947 *Betrayal of A Nation*. A manuscript. Robinson came to South Korea in November 1945 as a soldier. However, after a full year, he worked as a civilian in the military government. “The US military policy was a failure in the first place because there was no proper information about Korea and the second was the wrong people who did not know anything about the process of forming a nation. It is a failure, and I think the United States has betrayed Korea in some ways.” He said that the division and war on the Korean peninsula are responsible for the United States in a quiet but clear and decisive tone. It is a story that has been said all the time in his manuscript for a book.

“The first goal of the US military was not to establish a democratic unification government but to create a barrier against Soviet and communist forces. They betrayed the best interest of the Korean people and the US, and caused a war on the Korean peninsula.” He was participating in the writing of the “The History of USAFIK”. [Source] Why Publication of the Book “Betrayal of A Nation” was forbidden in the United States ? (Korean). <http://blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=jchull22&logNo=221067943594>

25) Richard E. Rauterback 1981, 《韓國美軍政史》國際新聞社 出版部 譯 發行.

26) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Report, No. 79, March 20, 1947.

27) Jeju Shinbo(Korean), April 12, 1947.

28) Jeju Shinbo(Korean), April 17, 1947.

29) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 602, August 8, 1947.

30) “Conference between Under Secretary Draper and Mr. Syng-Man Rhee, March 28, 1948,” Memorandum for Record, Department of the Army.

was as if he already speak as if it's president of the Republic of Korea, he pretended to.

Intelligence report entitled 'Current communist activities in South Korea' written by the US 24th Corps which seems to have been drawn up based on a January 1948 report by the district office of the CIC in Cheju also attracts attention as follow :

The island of JEJU-DO is divided into right and left-wing camps but many intelligent leaders and the masses do not side with either party. There is no apparent trouble with the leftists and most of the so-called leftists are not communists. Since the majority of the islanders are ignorant of national and international political developments, they are easily swayed by all sorts of propaganda, emanating from either the right or the left, with the rightists pointing up a "Red scare" and making every effort to dominate the island, mainly through youth groups and the exclusion of leftists from public office. Significantly, the left-wing of JEJU-DO is not anti-American and recent instances of terrorism have been rightist instigated. As a group the people are primarily concerned with their inherent poverty and evidence a lesser interest in politics.³¹

Governor Yoo was audited by USAMGIK from November 1947. This audit led by Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, special inspector of the military government, was conducted intensively in Seoul and Jeju from 12 November 1947 to 28 February 1948. Lieutenant Colonel Nelson wrote up a long special report on the results of this audit. This report titled, "Report of Special Investigation - Cheju-do Political Situation," revealed that the audit was conducted under the command of E. J. Johnson, chief advisor of the provisional government of Korea.³² The audit report called for the dismissal of Yoo Hae-jin, the Cheju governor under the USAMGIK, but the proposal was not accepted by U.S. military authorities.

The seed of grand tragedy was crawling about to pop. Is it the path of unification and peace? Is it the road to division or war? Koreans were wandering in front of a forked road. By the way, on April 5, 1948, the Commander of the United States Army Command, Hodge issued a decree on human rights. "Everyone is equal before the law, protected by the law, and the privilege of a sex, career, or belief is

not recognized, except for the exceptions laid down by international law (article 1)." "No one can take away life, liberty, or property without legal processes (article 4)."

April 3rd 1948 Popular Uprising

The United States thought that the new Korea issue would be solved by the conclusion of the US-Soviet Joint Committee, and that the left and right joint committee in South Korea would play a role, but failed. The U.S. tried to hand over the issue to the United Nations. The position of Rhee's independent South Korean government also influenced the politics of Washington D.C. The 2nd General Assembly of The United Nations has decided to hold its own divided general election in South Korea (November 14, 1947) and has formed a UN Temporary Commission on Korea to monitor it and dispatched it to South Korea

After Japan was defeated in the Pacific War, the hope and national vision that liberation would come to the Korean people and form a new independent nation and national unification nation were gradually disappearing. The revolution was denied, as Cummings pointed out. The world's largest anti-communist bulwark was being built in the geopolitical location of the South Korea.³³

The people obey by a gesture of submission and obey oppression and control. But the people are protesting, resisting and rising against oppression, control and domination. The Cheju April 3rd 1948 popular uprising was an indispensable choice not only to resist the oppression of the U.S. military army in South Korea but also to boycott the divide and separate general election of South Korea. Since February 1948, the police of USAMGIK police have been forced to rise up with everything exposed. Popular guerrilla had only thirty gun among about three hundred and fifty partisan, and attacked the twelve police station with bamboo spears and other weapons. There is no option for the Cheju islanders whether go to Mt. Halla for resist or go to Japan and mainland secretly.

Numerous sincere patriots, nationalists, middle powers, progressives, socialists, and communists,

31) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 123, January 23, 1948.

32) "Report of Special Investigation - Governor Ryu, Hai Chin (Yoo Hae-jin) of Cheju-do Island," March 11, 1948, Report of Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK.

33) Cummings, B. (1981) *Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

except for Syng-Man Rhee, have opposed the US and the United Nations' independent general election in South Korea to divide a nation. Under these circumstances, the South Korean Worker's Party set up a strategy to disrupt the election: the so-called '2 · 7 Protest for Saving the Nation' which instigated a general strike from 7 February 1948. The South Korean Labor Party presented nine slogans for the protest. They are as follows:

1. We oppose the UN Temporary Commission on Korea which is implementing policies that aim to perpetuate the division of Korea.
2. We oppose the establishment of a government only in South Korea.
3. The matter of establishing a unified Korean democratic nation should be left to the Korean people by simultaneously withdrawing the troops of the two foreign nations.
4. Pro-Japanese collaborators and instruments of international imperialism should be opposed, such as Rhee Syng-man and Kim Seong-su.
5. Enact labor laws and social insurance programs immediately to protect laborers and office workers.
6. Double the wages of laborers.
7. Hand over power to the People's Committee.
8. Confiscate lands from landlords and distribute them to farmers for free.
9. Hurray for the Korean People's Republic!³⁴

What is noteworthy here is that the Cheju chapter of SKWP did not engage in the general strike in September and the October uprising 1946. And also Cheju islanders did not participate in the general strike in February 1948.

The U.S. military government stationed the US CIC in Cheju around March 1947. The police under U.S. Military Government arrested 20 people, including the first Cheju governor in August 1947. The Cheju police under U.S. military government in Korea raided the illegal meeting of the communist to riot on Jan. 22, 1948 in the Chocheon district of Cheju Island chapter of SKLP and arrested 221 people.³⁵ After the massive arrests, the chairman and other high-ranking officials of Cheju chapter of SKWP were arrested and questioned by police. Three young men who were taken into police custody in March 1948 were killed by torture from police. The case received

international attention from the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Eleven police officers were brought to the Military Government's court, all sentenced to jail. The April 3rd 1948 popular uprising took place despite the fact that the organizations of the SKWP was exposed to the public by the police.

Peace Talk

The Cheju Island guerrillas had only a poor level of attacking power. When the uprising in Cheju Island against the May 10 general election broke out, the U.S. military authorities regarded it as a mere security situation, a kind of disturbance. Because the general election's boycott campaign was a nationwide situation at that time. Later, Merrill insisted that this resistance be a rebellion and a domestic case.³⁶ The US Army Military Government considered this uprising a problem of public peace, a merely disturbance at the early stage of the uprising.³⁷ As the uprising occurred, the US Army Military Government rushed about 100 police officers from Chollanam-do for support to Cheju in the morning on April 5. The Cheju Emergency Defense Headquarters was established in the Cheju Provincial Police Agency and Kim Jeong-ho, the chief of the public security department of the Ministry of Police Affairs, was dispatched.³⁸

US military authority judged that they could deal with the situation by reinforcing the police supporting unit, blocking sea traffic and other areas, mobilizing U.S. naval vessels, and even reinforcing the North West Youth Association, an ultra-right anti-communist group, to calm the situation. The U.S. military government's measures have not worked very well.

The leading members of the US Army Military Government had become aware of the limits of the police force, on April 16, 1948, the U.S. Military Government ordered the dispatch and operation of the armed forces to subdue the April 3rd Uprising. The Major General, United States Army, Military Governor, William Dean issued an oral order on April 16, 1948 at 18:00 for the joint operation of the Coast

34) Department of Public Security at the Supreme Prosecutors' Office of Korea, Records of Left-Wing Trials, Vol. 1(1965), p.372.

35) Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Periodic Report, No. 753, February 7, 1948.

36) Merrill, J. (1980) 'The Cheju-Do Rebellion', Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 2, pp. 139-97.

37) Id. 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report . p. 238.

38) Dokrip Shinbo(Korean), April 7, 1948; Jeju Shinbo(Korean), April 10, 1948.

Guard and Constabulary.³⁹

So they commanded the 9th Regiment of the Korea Constabulary to participate in a repression operation on April 17 through Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mansfield, commander of the 59th US Military Government Company stationed in Cheju. One battalion of the 5th regiment that had been stationed in Jinhae, Pusan was ordered to be dispatched to Cheju as of April 20, and Captain Clarence Dog De Reus, a US Army advisor, at the 3rd Regiment in Pusan also joined the repression operation.⁴⁰ The US Military Governor Dean gave an order to Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield on April 18, 1948 as follows:⁴¹

1. You are well-versed in conditions of Cheju.
2. Two L-5 liaison aircrafts that arrived at Cheju on April 18 are under your control.
3. Additional troops from the South Korean Defense Force's will arrive at Cheju on April 20. The additional troops will be under your operational control just like the other South Korean Defense Forces on arrival.
4. You may utilize the military troops in putting down the rioters in Cheju and reinstating law and order.
5. Make contact with a leader of rioters and make your best efforts to give them an opportunity to surrender before you push forward a full-scale attack.
6. Do not transfer prisoners of war, who were captured during an operation of the Korea Constabulary, to the police. Keep them in barracks that were prepared and protected by the Korea Constabulary, and send them to the mainland as soon as possible.
7. Report the daily situation to headquarters through radio communications.⁴²

Major General Dean of the U.S. Military Government ordered the troops to go out on their own, dispatch an American combat force to the fields, and control operations. In light of the worsening civil-police relations, the US. commander instructed the 9th Constabulary commander to try to negotiate peace with the guerrillas. Therefore, the ninth Constabulary

produced and distributed leaflets on negotiating proposals as follows:

Dear all brother

We have personally seen the struggle of the Brotherhood over the past fifteen days. From now on, it will be the heartfelt love for nation. and the desire for decisiveness for national independence and full independence of yours.

And I knew the naked true mind of brotherhood beyond life and death. Therefore I acknowledged that same nationals are fighting and killing each other, like brothers, same families conflict and fight each other which is worthless and profitless. Our National Defense Guard is not a political tool. I have all the will to try to shake my brother and to make a firm handshake in order not to enlarge the same family conflict and fight each other.

I look forward to the answer of brotherhood. I hope that you can present the proper day and place where we can meet in any way.

April 22, 1948

9th Constabulary Army Colonel Kim Ik-ryul

So peace negotiation was attempted but was cancelled due to interference from US military government and the police. Although the Peace Negotiation was initially ordered by Major General Dean, the US Military Governor, the US 24th Corps Headquarters intervened just before the negotiation started. Considering that command of the US 24th Corps G-3 is equal to the command of the US 24th Corps Commander John R. Hodge, who was also the United States Armed Forces Commander in Korea, General Hodge had directly intervened in the Peace Negotiation. Ordered by US 24th Corps G-3 A. C. Tychsen, Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Schewe arrived at Cheju on April 27, a day before the negotiation with the Cheju guerrillas. The missions and activities of Lieutenant Colonel Schewe are documented in detail on his report.⁴³ According to the report, on arriving at Cheju on April 27, Lieutenant Colonel Schewe met Lieutenant Colonel John S. Mansfield, commander of the 59th US Military Government Company, Colonel Rothwell H. Brown, commander of the US 20th Regiment, Major Geist, in charge of the military strength of the US 20th Regiment dispatched

39) USAMGIK, USAFIK 16 Apr., 1948. in US data book of The National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incidents (Korean and English). No. 3. pp. 24-25.

40) "Message," April 17, RG 338: Records of US Army Command (1942-), US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Bulk Declass E. O. Misc. Series, Box No. 119, NARA, Washington, D.C.

41) Id. 2013 The Jeju 4·3 Incidents Investigation Report . p. 242.

42) "Cheju-Do Operation," April 18, 1948, RG 338: Records of US Army Command (1942-), US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 68, NARA, Washington D.C.

43) "Disposition Form, Report of Activities at Cheju-Do Island," April 29, 1948, RG 338: Records of US Army Command (1942-), US Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49, Entry No. 11071, Box No. 68, NARA, Washington, D. C.

in Cheju, and Captain De Reus, an advisor of the 5th Regiment of the Korea Constabulary, to discuss the situations of Cheju.⁴⁴

On May 3, 1948, the executives of US Army including Military Governor Dean ordered the General Headquarters of the Korea Constabulary to start an all-out attack on the armed rebels to settle the situation of Cheju in a short time. Because the U.S. military command wanted to hurry to end the crackdown and there was only one week left before the first general election on May 10, 1948 in South Korea. It is a very good indication that too many U.S. Army officers have gone to Cheju to order, command, and control hard-line strikes.

On May 5, 1948, US Military Governor Dean visited Cheju to hold a closed operations conference with Civil Administrator Ahn Jae-hong, National Police Agency Chief Cho Byung Ok and National Defense Commander Song Ho-seong. This conference was attended by nine people of the executives of the military and the police including Lieutenant Colonel Mansfield in Cheju, Cheju Governor Yoo Hae-jin, Lieutenant Colonel Kim Ik-ryeol, Cheju Police Inspection Office Director Choi Cheon and interpreters for General Dean. The results of the operations conference were the adoption of the replacement of 9th Regimental Commander and a crackdown operation to exterminate the communists.

While peace negotiations in April 1948 have been attempted, the Red Purge Policy of the United States Army Force has been repeated, organized, and deployed extensively in these crackdown operations.

After the 5 · 10 General Election failed in Cheju, the US Army Military Government dispatched Colonel Rothwell H. Brown, Commander of the 20th Regiment under the command of the US 6th Division stationed in Gwangju, as the US commander of Cheju area for directing and leading all repression operations on May 20, 1948. Now, the U.S. military has actively launched anti-Communist punitive operations without anyone's check or interference.

"Militarily, U.S Soldiers adhered to the broad anti-partisan principles that had been included in every edition of FM 1005—since 1939. They consistently pressed for inspired leadership and aggressive action, urging their counterparts to

break free from block house mentalities and enervating piecemeal deployment, killing the enemy and breaking his will to resist, not seizing and holding terrain, were the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency."⁴⁵

The U.S. military officers who had been sent to Cheju to order, command, and control the hard-line anti-communist operation continued until the Cheju people were considered enemies and were destroyed in accordance with the field code. So they did not distinguish civilians from guerrillas, and did not distinguish the armed forces of the guerillas from the unarmed refugees. It was only a plan and implementation of a hard-line suppression operation. It is the biggest reason that the U.S. military should be responsible for the Cheju massacres.

Illegal Martial Law

The 14th Regiment stationed in Yeosu refused to act on the order to slaughter the Cheju people and opposed fighting among the same people each other. It caused a mutiny. Soldier Committee to refusal of order and move for Cheju suppression argued for the following position:

An appeal to the patriotic people

We are the sons of the peasants, the workers, and the people of the Korea. We are well aware that our mission is to defend the country and devote our lives to the rights and benefits of the people. We refused to slaughter our countrymen as sons of the Chosun(Korea) people in an attempt to force us to indiscriminately kill the patriots on Cheju Island and recaptured them for the welfare of the Chosun people.

1. oppose fight among the same people desperately
2. Withdrawal U.S. troops immediately

Soldier Committee to refusal of order and move for Cheju suppression

The U.S. army persuaded its military leaders to repeat hard-line tactics by persuading them to repeat the operation as if martial law existed even though martial law did not exist.

"I am enclosing a document on martial law. This document can be released to all your

44) Id. 2013 The Jeju 4-3 Incidents Investigation Report. pp. 246-247.

45) Andrew James Birtle 2007 U.S Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine : 1942-1976 Government Printing Office. Center of Military History, U.S Army. P.120.

commanders to make them aware of what martial law is, when it can be announced, who is making its announcement and what its effects are."⁴⁶

Now, military and police for suppression have slaughtered innocent Cheju residents who are unarmed and without legal procedures. There was no guilty conscience. But they clearly had the goal of eliminating communism and certainly had the intention of exterminating the other to achieve it.

Who is Responsible for Bloody Massacre of Innocent Islanders

Today Cheju and Korean people are coming forward to retell their stories and memories of their experiences during this period. They are revealing the brutality, atrocities and violations of human rights they experienced during Cheju Massacre and April 3rd(4·3) Uprising, and are demand the restorative justice and their human rights as well as just reparations for the injustices and crimes against humanity committed on Cheju Islanders which included more than 30,000 slaughtered.

The Cheju massacres, which lasted from March 1st, 1947, to September 21, 1954, are an international case. In particular, the time from March 1st, 1947 to June 29, 1949 when so many Cheju islanders were massacred, US military force commanded, controlled, ordered and supported to Korean police and military force did it. The US military provided military tactical guidance to Korean police and soldiers, jointly planned and simulated military operations. US military force blocked the sea, scouted by airplanes, provided M1 Garand(the United States Rifle, Caliber .30, M1) and Winchester M1 Carbine rifles, pistol and bullets, grenade, machine gun and GMC truck manufactured in the United States, trained how to use rifles, and trained military training.

During the peace time in the US military occupation period, various human rights violations such as massacre, forced arrest, mass confinement and torture were frequent, and the massacre continued during the Syng-Man Rhee regime. Many people fled to Japan, and for the

first time in the residential area of Osaka Japan, the first time a memorial service for the victims of Cheju massacre was held in December 1948 and February, 1949. The fact that the police and the army slaughtered Jeju citizens with guns as soon as the April 3 uprising occurred, refusing, refusing to conduct the South Korean divide election conducted by the US military under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) Temporary Commission on Korea through World War II, international law, especially international human rights law, developed further. The postwar International Human Rights Act prohibits serious, repetitive, systematic and systematic human rights violations by the state and has developed it as a norm of customary international law. In other words, the prohibition of slavery and genocide, racism, and torture was established as a norm in customary international law. These norms define that any country that has joined the treaty to guarantee human rights before and after World War II can be punished as an international crime if it violates and violates all the countries attributable to the international community. In short, the norm of prohibition of mass murder already constitutes customary international law. Similarly, the obligation to ban civilian genocide is not an obligation to other treaty-signing nations but an obligation to the international community, *erga omnes*(a Latin phrase which means "towards all" or "towards everyone"), a general duty, an obligation to the international community, and *jus cogens*, a peremptory norm.

For example, after the massacre of millions of Jews by Hitler's delusions during World War II, mankind established the United Nations and developed the norms of customary international law that preceded international human rights law. The most important of these were the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in December 9, 1948. The United States tried to get out of the framework of the anti-genocide convention by delaying the ratification of the anti-genocide treaty and declaring reservations. However, if the soldiers and police had the right to suppress the April 3rd uprising in accordance with the logic of domestic law, even if they had arbitrarily executed the guerrillas and the Self-Defense Forces who did not participate in the hostilities The Martens Clause (the Hague Rules) already

46) "Martial Law," December 1, 1948, RG 338: Records of US Army Commands, Entry: Provisional Military Advisory Group (1948-1949) and Korean Military Advisory Group(1949-1953), Box 4.

stipulates the protection of civilians in combat situations. The protocol (the I protocol) on the additional Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949, and the protection of victims of international armed conflict, states "If this protocol or other international agreements do not apply, there is on the authority and protection of international law's principle from the civilians and established practices, Humanitarian principle, and prerogative of public consciences." It is the general practice of states and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

The victims of the Cheju massacres should take responsibility for the gross violation of the International Human Rights Act against the United States and the Republic of Korea. If you do not ask for responsibility for the unjust death of your parents, and brothers and sisters despite the fact that there are many victims' families, it is nothing more than a victim's rights to give up

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