On the Backgrounds of the Renaissance and the Renaissance Humanism- -Centering around the Epistemology and Soteriology of the Via Moderna-

Chan-moon Park
(WAIS, S. Korea)

Abstract

I had learned from history books that the Renaissance period was referred to a period of light and human-centrism, which succeeded the Medieval ages, a period of God-centrism, also called the dark ages. I questioned why the period of God-centrism had been called the dark ages, and why Luther's reformation had taken place. Further, if the Renaissance people had been human-centric, whether they had lived without God, or whether they had not needed Jesus. When I had studied a history for God's glory, He has guided me to a best way spiritually and physically, and most of all let me gain an answer to my academic questions; the following lecture is based on the answer.

As a Western history professor, I kept studying about Erasmus and about Renaissance humanism and received a Ph.D. (1995). I also published a book titled, Synthetic Interpretation on the Renaissance Humanism -focusing on Erasmus-like Humanists' Religious Thoughts (Hye-An, 2011: Korean Version). This article has revised and arranged a paper to lecture at the U. S. Mid-West UBF Staff meeting, in September of 2016.

Key words :
the Renaissance period, the Medieval ages, the period of God-centrism, Renaissance humanism, Synthetic Interpretation on the Renaissance Humanism, Erasmus-like Humanists' Religious Thoughts

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1) Chang Hoon Ko (President of World Association for Island Studies S.Korea) & Kyungwon Lee (Jeju National University, S.Korea) writr collaborative article titled as "Jeju Peace Island for Korea 2018: Towards Peace Island Education & Tourism Welfare Model at the Grass Roots Level based on Jeju World Peace Academy 2017 (WEIS volume 7 Number 3: September 30, 2017). This article tries to suggest alternative of finding 'a third way to island democracy to East Asian islands and cities.

Preface.

By God's grace, I met Jesus at an early age, and had a Christian view on the world. After military service, I returned to college to study history(1970), and decided to study hard for God's glory.

At that time, I had learned from history books that the Renaissance period was referred to a period of light and human-centrism, which succeeded the Medieval ages, a period of God-centrism, also called the dark ages. I questioned why the period of God-centrism had been called the dark ages, and why Luther's reformation had taken place.

Further, if the Renaissance people had been human-centric, whether they had lived without God, or whether they had not needed Jesus. When I had studied a history for God's glory, He has guided me to a best way spiritually and physically, and most of all let me gain an answer to my academic questions; the following lecture is based on the answer.

One day, a lecture of Dr. Kwang-Ju Lee[1], a professor in our department, granted me a new and great vision. He said that a Dutch Renaissance humanist named Erasmus had been fond of not only the classics of Ancient Greek and Roman periods, but also the Biblical classics. He and other humanists like him were called 'Christian humanists' or 'Biblical humanists.'

During this time, I entered graduate school in Seoul, Korea (1974), and received a MA degree (1978). However, I had not a spiritual, real satisfaction, but God granted me a desire to know Jesus better. He guided me to the Chong-no UBF (University Bible Fellowship) through one friend (1975). The following year, I got married to a beautiful and devout woman, Hannah (1976). Then I had a conviction of my salvation, based on Rom 10:9-10 (1979). Three years later, God led me to Je-Ju, to be a professor and to serve and co-work with Je-Ju UBF. In 1995, my family pioneered one chapter in Je-Ju. After retiring in February of 2011, and then we came to Chicago as silver missionaries (December, in 2013).

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1) Kwang-Ju Lee , Honorary Professor at In-Je University, has books and Korean translations, more than 20, including A Person, who is stood in History (1983), History of College (1997), Birth of Culture (2009), Birth of Discourse (2015) and so on.

The Advent of the Renaissance and the Renaissance Humanism.

First, the origin of the term Renaissance.

The origin of the term "Renaissance" is from the Latin renasci (revive or resuscitate in English), and Giorgio Vasari(1511-74) in Italy applied the Italian rinascita (rebirth or revival) to the revival of the arts in his book, The Lives of the Artists (1550), and so a historical term of Renaissance gradually came to being.[2]

According to him, it was only late in the thirteenth century that the great renewal of the art came with the two great Florentines Cimabue (c. 1240-1302) and Giotto (1266/7-1337). Two painters brought about the great restoration, by overcoming the coarse and harsh tradition of the Byzantine painting and imitating nature[3] ; to Vasari the direct imitation of nature was a return to nature, and a return to antiquity.[4]

Even before Vasari, persons, such as Boccaccio (1313-75), Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), Erasmus (1466-1536), and Dürer (1471-1528) in Germany, also referred to the renewal of the pictorial arts in each own's writing, personally,[5] but Vasari wrote his own book, said above, including not only painters, but sculptors, architects, from late in the thirteenth century to late in the sixteenth century, under a large theme of the revival of the arts in Italy and Flanders, so that he might claim that the period of renewal or rebirth different from the Middle Ages came; further either persons at that time or persons after that time called the period as 'the period of revival,' that is, 'the Renaissance period.'[6]

This revival, however, was not just in the arts, but of intellectual culture, centering around bonae literae (good learning or good literature) which occurred at almost the same time. First, Lorenzo Valla (1407-57), a humanist in Italy, wrote in the forward to his Elegantiae Linguae latinae[7] (Elegant Latin language), that 'those arts which are closest to the liberal arts, to wit, painting, sculpture, and architecture, were so long and so greatly degenerated and almost perished with letters themselves, and now are being reawakened and revived, and that there is such a flowering of fine artists and lettered men.'

More than 50 years later, even in Europe over the

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2) Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas, trans. James S. Holmes and Hans van Marle (Princeton Uni. Press, 1984), pp. 244-45, 246-47.
3) Giorgio Vasari, The Lives of the Artists, trans., with an Introduction and Notes by Julia C. Bondanella & Peter Bondanella (Oxford Uni., Press, 1991), p. 10, 13, 16, 18.
4) Huizinga, ibid., p. 247.
5) Ibid., pp. 247-48.
6) Vasari, op. cit., p. 5.
7) written in 1444, printed in 1471

Alps, Fran-ois Rabelais (1494-1553), a doctor and humanist in France, speaks of "the restoration of bonnes lettres" in Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532-34), full of jest and satire; Nicolas, who first edited Erasmus' Adagia ("A Collection of Adages") said that Erasmus, called 'the prince of the humanists,' cherished 'the letters then being reborn, emerging from the ugly foulness of prolonged barbarity…'[8]

Second, the origin of the term humanist.

The word, 'humanist' (humanista, in Latin) seems to have originated in the student slang ('umanista' in Italian) of the Italian universities late in the fifteenth century; this term was derived from an older term 'humanities' or studia humanitatis, which had been used in the general sense of 'an education on languages and letters' or 'a liberal or literal education,' by such ancient Roman authors as Cicero (106-43 BC) and Gellius (c. 125-180); this studia humanitatis was also derived from 'humanitas (means by humanity or culture in Latin)'[9]

Humanitas in itself was derived from paideia in the Hellenistic period (c. 320 - 30 BC.), which referred to a generic human culture or a universal education to let any person acquire such a culture. Cicero translated this term into humanitas, which he applied to any person who receives such an education or has such a culture; that term, humanitas, meant by dignitas (dignity, derived from decorum: propriety, fame), as a quality which distinguishes human-beings from animals; following Cicero, Renaissance humanists identified dignity of man with humanitas itself.[10]

Humanitatis is plural form of humanitas; Cicero or Gellius believed that any person would acquire a generic culture through the studia humanitatis(humanities); this term, studia humanitatis begins to be used again by humanists, including Salutati(1331-1406: Italy), in the late fourteen century.[11]

By the first half of the fifteenth century, the term "studia humanitatis" came to stand for a clearly defined cycle of curriculums, namely, grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy, and also included the reading and interpretation of its standard ancients writers in Latin and, to a lesser extent, in Greek. [12]

So, Renaissance humanists were referred to as

teachers or professors, who studied, wrote on, and taught the studia humanitatis, or scholars, who collected, studied the classics, wrote on, and taught it; among these great humanists, there were also those such as Petrarch, Valla in Italy or Erasmus in the Netherlands who studied, taught, and wrote on, not only the Greek and Roman classics, but also the Christian classics, that is, the Bible or the Christian Fathers.[13]

This word humanista (humanist) in Latin, was commonly used in its vernaculars, such as in Italian, French, English, Spanish, and other languages in the sixteenth century. These humanists, as Burckhardt said, had 'the spirit of a personal definition of aims and a free determination of the course of one's life,' like the types of despots, condottieri, diplomats, courtiers, and nepotists.[14]

Third, the origin of the term humanism.

Then, when, how did the term humanism begin to be used? That was not first used in the Renaissance period, Italy, but the term Humanismus in German was coined in 1808 by the German educator, Niethammer (1766-1848)[15] ; so, the term humanism was generally used to express the emphasis on the Greek and Latin classics in secondary education, as opposed to the rising demands for more practical and more scientific training. Since then, the term has been mostly associated with the Renaissance and its classical studies.

The backgrounds of the Renaissance and the Renaissance humanism.

Then, let's consider under what backgrounds that this Renaissance and the Renaissance humanism took place, even in Europe over the Alps, including Italy.

First, political, social, economic, and cultural backgrounds.

Despite a series of economic crises and stagnations, all over the Europe, after the late thirteenth century, the development of a monetary economy made the centralization of government possible through the introduction of an efficient finance system and a standing army system; this led to the modern European system, consisting of nation-states, which collapsed the Medieval dualistic system, represented by an emperor and a pope.[16]

The monetary economy also gradually increased

8) Erasmus, Adagia, ed. Nicolas Chesneau, Paris, 1571.
9) Chanmoon Park, Synthetic Interpretation on Renaissance Humanism- focusing on Erasmus-like Humanists' Religious Thoughts- (Hye-an, 2011: Korean Version), p. 35; Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought- The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 9.
10) Park, op. cit., pp. 35-36, cf. n. 46.
11) Ibid.
12) Kristeller, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

13) Park, ibid., p. 49, refer to n. 84; Kristeller, ibid., p. 74.
14) Huizinga, op. cit., pp. 256-57.
15) Kristeller, ibid., p. 9.
16) Park, op. cit., pp. 13 -14.

the citizens' or laymen's power while weakening the authority of the aristocracy and the clergy, including the pope. Culturally, a continuous development of lay education led to a remarkable growth of a layman's participation in Renaissance culture.[17]

In the mid-fifteenth century, most of all, the invention of the printing press allowed writings through the lay clergy to become easily accessible to the intelligent and literate layman. This is the reason why Erasmus' Enchiridion militis christiani (The Handbook of Christian Soldiers: 1503) could be so successful, and his works became widespread by publishing it in English, Czech, German, Netherlandish, Spanish, and Polish, except Latin.[18]

Second, the growth of the lay class was accompanied with a remarkable growth of lay piety.

This revival of lay piety was inspired by sermons of mystics, like Eckhart (1260-1327), and Tauler (1290-- 1361) of Germany, in the fourteenth century, and was succeeded, developed by mystic movement, like 'The Friends of God' in the Rhineland.[19]

Another type of mystic movement was 'Devotio Moderna (New Devotion or New Piety)' in the Low Countries (a coastal region in western Europe, consisting especially of the Netherlands and Belgium). Devotio Moderna was begun by Gerhardt Groote (1340-84), a layman of Deventer, who offered his house to poor sisters, for helping them to prepare for the place to simply worship God peacefully.[20]

1) Imitatio Christi: This was a practical mysticism, different from the speculative, pantheistic mysticism of Eckhart,[21] and this mystic thought of Devotio Moderna was expressed clearly in Imitatio Christi (The Imitation of Christ) by Thomas á Kempis (1380-1471). This Devotio Moderna at first was not nearly concerned with a lay education, but it assumes a major pedagogical role as well as a monastic role through the Brethren of the Common Life.[22]

2) The Brethren of the Common Life: The Brethren of the Common Life was founded by Radewijns (1350-1400), a disciple of Groote in the fifteenth century. At that time, teachers, scholars, and humanists of the Brethren of the Common Life, such as Cele (1375-1417), Hegius (1433-1498), Gansfort (1419-1489), and Agricola (1442-1485), founded schools in Deventer, Zuolle, Münster and

so on, in Europe over the Alps.[23]

3) The impact of the Brethren: These schools aimed for church reformation, but the curriculums included not only Christian ones, but also pagan ones, like classical literature, grammar, rhetoric, logic, mathematics, and philosophy etc. The advent of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64), Martin Luther (1483-1546), and Calvin (1509-64) are related to their educational influences. Most of all, Erasmus (1466-1536) was greatly impressed with the harmony between the pietistic faith and the classical learning at the Deventer school and he himself persevered in his efforts for its attainment.[24]

Third, doctrinal diversity was developed from the later Medieval period through the fifteenth centuries. Various factors contributed to this development.

Many distinct theological schools emerged during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, with differing philosophical presuppositions and methods; these schools tended to be based upon, or associated with, specific religious orders[25]

1) The University of Paris: Paris was the theological center of Europe in the end of the twelfth century and its theological schools already showed the disagreement of the views among masters, such as Peter Abelard (1079-1142: theologian in France), Peter Lombard (1100-60: theologian; bishop of Paris), and Hugh of St Victor (1096-1141: a mystic Augustinian monk; theologian, in France).

2) The Dominican and the early Franciscan Order: Most of all, the Dominicans, like John of Giles (d. 1259/60, England), Roland of Cremona (1178-1259, Italy), and the Franciscans, like Alexander of Hales (1185-1245, England), Roger Bacon (1214-92, England) arrived at Paris after the second decade of the thirteenth century.[26]

These friars gradually seized three chairs of theology at the Paris University from the control of secular masters to that of their orders; the opinions of the first Dominican and Franciscan professors came to be perpetuated in the teachings of the early Dominican and Franciscan schools, culminating in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74, Italy) and Bonaventure (1221-74, Italy) respectively.

3) The early Augustinian Order: Slightly later, a distinct school developed within the Augustinian Order, based upon the writings of Giles of Rome (1243-1316), who was the first Augustinian

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17) Ibid., p. 14.
18) Ibid., p. 15.
19) Ibid., p. 14.
20) Park, op. cit., pp. 264-65.
21) David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (Longman, 2nd edition, 1988), pp. 285-86.
22) Park, ibid., pp. 265-66.

23) Loc. cit.
24) Ibid., p. 266.
25) Alister E. McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (Blackwell, 2004), p. 18. This reference will be named McGrath I below here.
26) McGrath I, p. 19; Knowles, op. cit., pp. 210-11.

appointed to teach at the University of Paris; he followed the Via Antiqua;[27] Giles of Rome and those who followed him belonged to the early Augustinian school. The Via Antiqua is treated with the Via Moderna in the next section.

The controversy between the Via Antiqua and Via Moderna concerning the merits of the logico-critical method in theology was developed.[28] In particular, the Via Moderna had a big impact on each friar or theologian, regardless of the religious orders.

The Via Antiqua (the "old way") referred to the "realism," and Thomas Aquinas (a typical Dominican) and Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308: an early Franciscan, England) were among representative realists; the Via Moderna (the "modern way") referred to the "nominalism," which was created by William Ockham (c. 1287–1347, England) and belonged to the later Franciscan school; here, we add to one school, that follows the Via Moderna; it is the Schola Augustiniana Moderna, or the later Augustinian school, created by Gregory of Rimini (1300–58, Italy).

1) The Via Antiqua: According to the moderate realism, human intelligence could abstract species to understand from specific expressions of sensuous experiences; by the way, human intelligence could perceive "a common nature," which was distinguished from individual beings through the species.[29] They thought that "a common nature (or universal)" in individual beings was a true entity, which was real, so they were called as realists; they distinguished "a common nature" from individual beings (or individuating principles).

At this time, Thomists, who followed Thomas Aquinas, and Scotus showed a subtle difference each other about how they distinguished both.[30] Scotus said, "Though they both are practically same, but are formally distinguished"; Thomists said, "They are distinguished only according to a way to think of them"; against them, Ockham thought all forms of common nature in individual beings to be self-contradictory and unreasonable.[31]

For example, realists referred to a substance as an absolute term of "father," and to an entity in the substance as an abstract term of "fatherhood"; about their argument, Ockham recognized a substance or universal, which was involved in a term of "father," or "fatherhood," but he did not think it to be real, and he thought it to be only a name.[32] To him, the problem of "Universal" was, as an epistemological problem, the one to explain how experiences on things to be individually might be revealed to concepts of universal nature or propositions to be confined universally;[33] in a word, his Via Moderna or Nominalism was a realistic conceptualism or a realistic empiricism as an epistemological problem.[34]

2) The Via Moderna: According to Ockham, first, an intuitive cognition about an object or event takes place, and then from this cognition directly, an abstract cognition takes place or an abstract concept is formed;[35] here he says that an abstract concept about an object can extend to a concept of universal nature about objects, similar to the first object, in the process of transferring from an intuitive cognition to an abstract cognition.[36]

So this concept, that is, an abstract concept or a realistic concept can be referred as a "common concept," on the other hand, a concept of the Via Antiqua or realists can be referred as an "objective concept, "because, said above, they thought that "a common nature (or universal)" in individual beings was an objective entity; on the other hand, the nominalists recognized a common nature (or universal) as a realistic concept or common concept and the concept, in a certain degree, also represented individual beings, but the concept was not the entity itself.[37]

Thus, we see that the Via Antiqua and the Via Moderna were two logico-critical methods for gaining epistemologies and ontologies in the later medieval periods. By the way, controversies between two methods among the same Dominicans, or the early and later Franciscans, or the early and later Augustinians, led to diversities of doctrines, such as not only "problems on universal," but also "Christology," or "Mariology,"[38] "the theology of justification," and so on; further, a matter of local heterogeneity within the Via Moderna has to be also born in mind, assessing the character and influence of the movement.[39]

27) Ibid., p. 284.
28) McGrath I, p. 20.
29) Park, op. cit., pp. 80–81.
30) Ibid., p. 81.
31) Loc. cit.
32) Ibid., p. 82.

33) Loc. cit.
34) Ibid., pp. 82–85.
35) Ibid., p. 84.
36) Loc. cit.
37) Klima Gyula, "The Medieval Problem of Universals," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall, 2013 ed.), Edward N. Zalta ed; Park, ibid., p. 86.
38) 1) the maculist position: for Mary to be subject original sin, established by Scholastics of the thirteenth century, till to the first half of the fourteenth century. 2) the immaculist position: for Mary to be in some way preserved from original sin, and thus to be considered sinless, through a power of popular piety, an increasing support within initially, the Franciscan Order, and then the University, in the early fourteenth century, and within even the Augustinian Order, beginning from the middle of fourteenth century, continuing into the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 3) The Council of Basle (1439) declared that the immaculate conception was a pious doctrine, but the pope did not adopt it (McGrath I, pp. 24–25).
39) Park, op. cit., pp. 73–74.

Then, let's examine differences on the theology of justification, in relation to the soteriology among three schools.

1) The Via Antiqua: It had a theology of justification, being current from the thirteenth century till the later medieval period; this was argued by Thomas Aquinas, who said that the human soul needed a habit of grace for the habitation of God, as an intermediate stage, owing to an enormous gulf between humanity and God; when the habit of grace happened to be in the soul and God was in it, Aquinas called the habitual grace "the created habits of grace."[40]

The realists thought that as 'justification' involves an ontological change in humanity, an ontological intermediate is required in the process of justification; this intermediate was to be identified with the created habit of grace or charity;[41] the realists, such as the early Franciscan schools or the early Augustinian schools, usually followed this theology of justification. By the way, Ockham applied the logico-critical method of the Via Moderna to another soteriology.

2) The Via Moderna: Ockham used the dialectic between the two powers of God, the ordained power and the absolute power of God, begun from the late 11th century or the early 12th century.

a. Scotus' dialectic– Thomas Aquinas or Duns Scotus also recognized this dialectic; most of all, Scotus and the Scotus, who followed him, employed the dialectic to defend the divine freedom, by emphasizing on the acceptatio divina (divine acceptance), understood as a direct personal acceptance of the believer by God,[42] irrespective of created intermediates, said above, like Thomas and the Thomists.

b. The dialectic and an economical deontological theology– Ockham took up and developed the preceding opinions; he and theologians of the Via Moderna, begun by him, and of the Schola Augustiniana Moderna, followed the Via Moderna, epistemologically, were able to eliminate unnecessary theological concepts and hypotheses through the appeal of this dialectic; it is seen that this reflects a more dynamic, economical, and commercial society than Thomas' age; this radical elimination revises the ontologically inflationary theologies of High Scholasticism in the thirteenth century to a more conceptually economical deontological theology of the later medieval period in the fourteenth century to the fifteenth century.[43]

He applied 'a methodological principle of economy' in an explaining[44] to his epistemology, too, by removing unnecessary abstract, extra-linguistic entities, through linguistic, logical, analyses,[45] said above; most of all, he applied the principle to a soteriology, through the dialectic; so, this dialectic underlies "Ockham's Razor."[46]

c. Ockham's dialectic– Let's consider Ockham's dialectic, a little more; he set up a dialectic between things as they might have been, and things as they actually are, corresponding to the absolute and ordained powers of God respectively;[47] this dialectic does not imply that there are two present courses of action open to God, but simply that the moral and physical ordering of creation must be recognized to be contingent rather than necessary.[48]

For God could have ordained a different ordering within the world, except anything contradictory logically; for example, the fact that it is impossible to construct a triangle with four sides is not seen as compromising God's omnipotence and freedom.[49] Once God has decided to create and work within a certain order, God is under an obligation to respect this order; yet this is not a case of God being under external constraint, or acting of necessity.[50]

d. Ockham's covenantal theology– Before going to this, first, let's make summary of how the dialectic had influences over the theology of justification among theologians of the Via Moderna and the Schola Augustiniana Moderna. Ockham understands 'the created habits of grace' or 'the created intermediates' for a justification, accepted widely by the realists; but he says that it does not need for a justification of humanity, because the Almighty God can directly do it, according to his good will; Duns Scotus also argued that it did not need, through the "acceptatio divina (divine acceptance)," said above; Ockham develops it more through the dialectic.

To suggest that 'such habits are involved in justification as a matter of necessity (ex natura rei: from nature of thing)' is to imply that 'God was subjected to external constraint in establishing the created order'; he argues that it is unthinkable. From the absolute power (De potentia absoluta), he says, God could have established an order of being in which created habits are not involved in justification, in that no logical contradiction involved in this suggestion.[51]

Even if the created habits are involved, he exploits the tension between the absolute and ordained powers to demonstrate the contingency of the role

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40) Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Instruction (John Wiley & Sons, 2011), p. 356.
41) McGrath I, p. 76.
42) ibid., p. 78.
43) Ibid., p. 74.
44) Park, op. cit., p. 85.
45) Ibid., p. 86.
46) McGrath I, p. 74.
47) Ibid., p. 20.
48) Ibid., p. 21.
49) Loc. cit.; ibid., p. 75.
50) Ibid., p. 21.
51) Ibid., p. 77.

assigned to created habits in justification; the fact that they are involved in the established order is the result of God's decision that this shall be the case; in effect, Ockham works with a concept of covenantal, rather than ontological, causality.

In other words, created habits are involved in the causal sequence of justification, not because of the nature of the entities involved (ex natura rei), but because of the divine will (ex pacto divino). Let's examine a covenantal, deontological theology among the theologians of the Via Moderna, including Gabriel Biel (1420–95: a theologian in Tübingen), a little more.

They understand that the covenant is established unilaterally by God, so that if people may do quod in se est (what is in oneself),[52] God has determined to reward the people, who do quod in se est, or meet the minimal precondition for justification, with the gift of justifying grace, according to his covenant or promise; this cannot be regarded as amounting to God being under an external obligation to someone else, or to some abstract and autonomous principles independent of God.

God entered into a personal obligation to humanity through the covenant; such an obligation exists ex pacto suo (from his own covenant) on account of God's faithfulness to his own decisions; this notion is no small importance to Luther's theology in the late 1510s and early 1520s;[53] in particular, through Staupitz (1460–1524), trained in the theology of Gabriel Biel.

The basic structure of the covenant in Staupitz was the same that found in nominalism generally; the new element introduced by him was the role given to Christ in the pre-Fall situation; he thought that before the Fall, Adam had been in a cooperative relationship with God in Christ. After the Fall, he still left room for human cooperation with God through Christ in salvation; to him, the first grace of justification could not be obtained by human merit. What was necessary was a proper moral desire for its reception; such a grace was freely bestowed on those to desire it truly.[54]

By the way, this grace was owed to the elect on grounds of God's covenantal obligation made in Christ; on the other hand, the increase of grace in the elect was matter of the merit of one's good

works;[55] this writer sees that his opinion was similar to a representative humanist, Erasmus' opinion.[56]

There is a highly significant Christological lacuna in the soteriology of the Via Moderna, in that the salvation of humanity may be discussed without necessary reference to the incarnation and death of Christ; the theologians tend to refer to Christ as Legislator rather than Savior; nevertheless, for them to exploit the pactum (contract) as both a soteriological and hermeneutical principle is very meaningful, because such a principle leads to permit an extensive degree of correlation with the covenantal language and themes of both the Old and New Testament;[57] in particular, it is understood that the principle might lead to Luther's Biblical realism;[58] although Luther did not accept the cooperative relationship between God and humanity, based on the covenant in Via Moderna, he accepted a personalism or a principle of depending on the Bible, through the covenant.[59]

The early Calvinists, including Calvin (1509–64), influenced by Bullinger, have the Reformed organic conception of covenant: they overcome the Scholastic dichotomy between nature and grace, through intensive study of the Scripture, and accept the reward of greater blessing for the covenantal obedience; federalists (the later Calvinists who emphasized covenant) in the later sixteenth century specified double covenant, the covenant of works and the covenant of grace.[60]

3) The early Augustinian Order–Theologians of the early Augustinian school, from Giles of Rome(1243–1316) to Thomas of Strasbourg (1275–1357, from France), who followed the via antiqua, as realists epistemologically, adopted a theology of justification, determined intrinsically and ontologically, characteristic of the early Dominicans or Franciscans, that is, the realists except Scotus (1266–1308) and the Scotus who followed him.[61]

By the way, they adopted the historical-critical method;[62] at the time, as many pseudo-Augustinian texts was in circulation, they wanted to have true

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52) "quod in se est"– According to Erasmus, Augustine, at first, also recognized that 'an innate impulse to do good leaves in a human-being', in other words, that 'though this strength weakened after the Fall, and was not destroyed.' But, in the process of controversy with Pelagius, he did not attribute a human-being's will to anything, in accepting a grace of justification (Park, op. cit., p. 106).
53) McGrath I, pp. 78–79.
54) Mark W. Karlberg, Covenant Theology in Reformed Perspective (Wipf and Stock Publishers,2000), p. 97.
55) McGrath I, loc. cit.
56) Park, op. cit., pp. 103–113.
57) The impact that the covenant theology of the Via Moderna had on the Reformed theology: Zwingli (1484–1531) perceived the unity of the Testaments in terms of the unity of the Covenant of Grace; Bullinger (1504–75) succeeded to Zwingli, and he also says that in the substance of the Covenant of Grace there is unity, although in accidents, there is diversity (Mark, ibid., pp. 20–22).
58) McGrath I, p. 79.
59) Ibid., pp. 78–79.
60) Mark, ibid., pp. 97–98: They viewed the pre-redemptive period, before or after the fall, in terms of the covenant of works (or nature), and the redemptive period, in terms of the covenant of grace. On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas saw it as a dichotomy between nature and grace.
61) McGrath I, p. 85.
62) Ibid., p. 84.

texts and establish the Augustine's right views, in particular, in the area of soteriology; they come across his emphasis on the priority of caritas(love) and gratia(grace) in justification, I think, through Augustine's writings; although it did not have a big impact on them, the Augustin's theology of justification is restored by the next generation, Gregory of Rimini.

4) The later Augustinian Order- On the other hand, theologians of the later Augustinian school or the Schola Augustiniana Moderna, begun by Gregory of Rimini(1300–58), continuing into the sixteenth century, who followed the Via Moderna, particularly taught the priority of acts over habits, so that the formal cause of justification and merit came to be identified as the extrinsic denomination of the acceptatio divina (divine acceptance), rather than the intrinsic denomination of the created habit of grace.[63]

By the way, they were linked to other teachings, based on Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings,[64] such as man's total depravity, which set them apart from the Via Moderna;[65] so they developed an anti-Pelagian theology of grace, including a theology of absolute double predestination, an emphasis upon the depravity of humanity, and the necessity of divine grace for morally good acts, which is far removed both from the soteriology of the Via Moderna and from theology of the earlier Augustinian tradition from Giles of Rome.[66]

5) Voluntarism- Let's examine it in relation to this lecture. Thomas Aquinas argued the intellectualism that reason is at advantage over will; according to him, the divine intellect recognizes a moral value, and then the divine will thence effects the meritorious value of an act, that is, the merit, pleased and justified by God;[67] this merit, I think, is 'the created habit of grace,' said above. Against this, Scotus and Ockham insist on the voluntarism; for Scotus, the ratio meriti (the praiseworthy reason) is understood to lie in the divine will- more specifically, in the extrinsic denomination of the acceptatio divina,[68] said above. Ockham developed this voluntarism more; for him, the liberum arbitrium (free will) was a foundation on the dignity of man, and the moral good and responsibility, as more important than the power of thought.[69]

By the way, he repudiated the propriety of moral act willed freely, for man's perfect salvation; he argued that man's motive must be only induced the

most perfectly, freely, for its act to be meritorious to God. A merciful act as the result of already acquired habit, he says, is not free or valuable morally; for him, 'an act of the meritorious value,' was meritum congruum (proper merit) of person, who does quod in se est (what is in oneself). But this does not mean that man's salvation depends on each one's merit, but on God's absolute free will; he has been assessed not to have a Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism, but to anticipate Luther.[70]

6) A Renaissance humanists' position: In particular, Christian humanists (or Biblical humanists), from on Petrarch to Erasmus, used a reasoning of discourse from the rhetorical, humanistic tradition, based on not only pagan classics, but also Christian classics, that is, the Bible or Christian Fathers; so they were about to solve problems of spiritual, moral conflicts between free will and grace. They did not follow Ockham's Via Moderna or Gregory of Rimini's or Luther's theological opinions, but understood or had some sympathy with their thoughts or positions; so, they had, I think, a grace to reach the perfect salvation in Jesus Christ.[71]

Fourth, a phenomenon in the absence of the magisterium.

Such was the confusion concerning what constituted the official teaching and what was merely theological opinion that an astonishing diversity of views on the justification before God were in circulation at the opening of the sixteenth century.[72] Diverse theological opinions might be tolerated, because they do not pose a threat the unity of the church, so long as the official teachings are suggested explicitly.[73]

But the Catholic Church made no magisterial statement concerning the doctrine of justification, during a period of more than a millennium between the Second Council of Orange (529) and the sixth session of the Council of Trent (1546). The Second Council of Orange condemned the doctrine of justification, corresponding to the semi-Pelagianism, that is coined in the sixteenth century to the seventeenth century, and adopted many evangelical doctrines concerning Augustine's justification; this doctrine seems to be admitted formally in the Catholic Church till to the ninth century.

However, after the tenth century, the doctrine was suppressed by the Scholasticism, because it did not state any other sacraments but the baptism according to the Bible; and so, the existence of the

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63) Loc. cit.
64) Ibid., p. 87.
65) McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough (2011), p. 89. This reference will be named McGrath III below here.
66) McGrath I, p. 86.
67) Ibid., p. 80.
68) Ibid., p. 81.
69) Park, op. cit., p. 96.

70) Ibid.; McGrath III, pp. 92– 94.
71) Park, ibid., pp. 97–113.
72) McGrath I, p. 27.
73) Ibid., p. 25.

council, as well as its decisions, appear to gradually have been unknown.[74] Diverse theological opinions might be tolerated, because they do not pose a threat the unity of the church, so long as the official teachings are suggested explicitly.[75]

As a result, the theologians of the medieval period thus based their doctrines of justification upon the decisions of the Council of Carthage (418), that condemned the Pelagianism; by the way, the council used terms such as "grace" in a less precise sense; this factor also led a wide spectrum of theologies of justification to pass into general circulation.[76]

In the fourteenth century, the Catholic Church tended to repress such opinions, as heresies by force; for examples, Spiritual Franciscans in the later Augustinian school, referred to the orthodox sect, who were going to adhere to and practice "Apostolic Poverty," followed St. Francis, were excommunicated, and condemned as heretics (1322), by Pope John XXII (reign: 1316–34), and then more than 110 were burned at the stake; Ockham was involved here, but had to be deported till the death. Wycliffe (d. 1384) was also condemned as a heretic, owing to a criticism on the clergy's supremacy and property rights, and denial of transubstantiation, and so on.[77]

On the one hand, the events, such as the Avignon Papacy (1309– 77), the Great Schism (1378–1417), serve as a momentum that the Papal power, increased during that time, but was put on the brake, and lost, by the secular power, in particular, a secular power of France; the rise of nationalism, from fifteenth century to the mid sixteenth century, let the ecclesiastical authorities neglect or be able not to take decisive action against heterodox views;[78] some thinking laymen or theologians tended not to trust in and loathe such clergy after the fourteenth century,[79] and so it was left to each theologian to decide which of diverse opinions had to accepted authentically as universal.[80]

Finally, the Catholic Church brought one church to dividing into the old and the new church, and did not bear a historical calling, I think, to be solved as the official church with magisterium, by primarily charging with the task of drawing a clear line between Catholic and Protestant teachings, through the Council of Trent (1545–63); Alister E. McGrath, an excellent theologian and professor of Historical Theology, at University of Oxford, said: 'it is quite misleading' that the Catholic Church referred to "the

Tridentine doctrine of justification," in the Council of Trent, 'in that there is no such single doctrine, but a broadly defined range of such theologies.'[81]

It is understood to mean that this is wrong as attitude to be hostile to or regard a faith and doctrine of Luther or Protestants as heresy, to establish doctrines and identity of its own rather, instead of adjusting and being reconciled conflicts among diverse opinions at that time; it was here a root of spiritual, moral crises that the Church at that time lost the power to converge and accept lay class, humanists, and theologians' request for reform.[82]

Conclusion.

It is Jacob Burckhardt in Switzerland, who was the first person in the Modern period to arrange a lot of opinions and interpretations on the Renaissance, and interpreted it with cultural–historical synthesis; he saw through that the Italian was the firstborn among the sons of Modern Europe,[83] and noted the rise of an individual, personal man, apart from a Medieval man, in his book, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1860).[84] According to him, a Medieval man was a member of a race, people, party, family, corporation, or church, and was not conscious of an individual or his own personality.[85]

These views of his were taken to be proper to some extent; however, in a way, critiques on him and works of revision were inevitable; now, it is understood that the Renaissance took place and developed, natively nearly at the same time, or interacting each other, not only in Italy but also in Europe across the Alps; it is also not only related with the Medieval period, but also it is taken to be the transitional period, gradually transiting from the Medieval periods to the Modern periods.[86] So, Huizinga referred to the Renaissance period as the autumn of the Medieval Ages.[87]

As said above, the Via Moderna, created by Ockham or the Schola Augustiniana Moderna, begun by Gregory of Rimini, took place in the first half of fourteenth century; this period corresponds

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74) Ibid., p. 26.
75) Ibid., p. 25.
76) Ibid.
77) Park, op. cit., p. 17.
78) Ibid.
79) Ibid., p. 15.
80) McGrath I, p. 27.

81) Ibid., p. 28.
82) Park, op. cit., p. 17.
83) Huizinga, op. cit., p. 257.
84) Ibid., pp. 256– 57.
85) Ibid.
86) Park, ibid., p. 19, refer to n. 2.
87) J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life, Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth Centuries, trans. F. Hopman, in 1924, published, Pickle Partners Publishing, 2016. He says that the XIVth and XVth centuries (the Renaissance Period) is not only a period of termination in the Middle Ages, but also a period of perfecting and concluding the old (Preface); this means that this period is the autumn of the Middle Ages, that harvests and awaits a new spring.

to the later Medieval period; more specifically, the periods from the second half of thirteenth century to the first half of fourteenth century, are usually referred to as the later

Medieval period; Ockham already argued that mankind could be saved, through a covenantal relationship between God and individual.

By the way, although Gregory of Rimini accepted Ockham's epistemology, according to the Via Moderna, but he restored an Augustine's faith of anti-Pelagianism, a little differently in soteriology, by coming into touch with Augustine's writings or the Bible; at any rate, each of them could have each one's opinion on epistemology or soteriology, because each one had an individual consciousness before God.

It is seen that such individualization or personalization is more progressive in the Renaissance period from the second half of the fourteenth century to the seventeenth century; as an example, Erasmus and Luther who came from the second half of the fifteenth century to the first half of sixteenth century, came across the Latin Bible, and read it; further Erasmus read the original New Testament in Greek, and translated it into Latin newly; Luther translated the Latin Bible into German. Practically, a small number of people only read in that way, but such a few persons made a new history; God uses such persons for his will.

It is said that the Modern period arrived in the eighteenth century, also called the Enlightenment period; this means it was the most anthropocentric at that time.[88] However, human being, culture, or age without God is destined to falling ill and to destruction. I think that there have been individuals and their communities, that love Jesus and the Bible in each age. Finally, this writer prays that one true person, who fears God and has a right historical consciousness, may come to us, that he will be able to fundamentally solve Je-ju 4-3 grand tragedy and further the reconciliation, the peace and the unification between the South and the North Korea.

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88) Ibid., p. 283.