

Recognition and Responsibility: The Moral Relevance of Pre-UN history to the Jeju Tragedy

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Abstract

I highlight morally relevant history – of Korea, of The United States and of The early years of the United Nations (UN), which tends to be ignored in the discussion of the Jeju tragedy – a seven year period of brutality on Jeju Island, South Korea, that lasted from March 1, 1947 to September 21, 1954. While discussions of these events acknowledge the responsibility of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), they overlook the connection of the tragedy to Korea's earlier history – such as its Independence Movement in the early 1900s. Also overlooked is the way in which the US created machinery in the early years of the UN that was the sine qua non of the controversial UN monitored elections which were the flashpoint of the incident. This Pre-UN and early UN history is poignantly connected to the Jeju tragedy, as we will see, and is crucial for understanding its full significance. Sadly, however, this history is dimly understood. For the sake of understanding the full scope of moral responsibility for the Jeju tragedy, and for reconnecting to the values and virtues important for all people, this overlooked history must be brought to light.

Key words :

Korea, The United States, the United Nations (UN), the Jeju Tragedy, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), Independence Movement in the early 1900s , the controversial UN monitored elections, moral responsibility

In this paper, I highlight morally relevant history – of Korea, of The United States and of The early years of the United Nations (UN), which tends to be ignored in the discussion of the Jeju tragedy – a seven year period of brutality on Jeju Island, South Korea, that lasted from March 1, 1947 to September 21, 1954. While discussions of these events acknowledge the responsibility of the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), they overlook the connection of the tragedy to Korea's earlier history – such as its Independence Movement in the early 1900s. Also overlooked is the way in which the US created machinery in the early years of the UN that was the sine qua non of the controversial UN monitored elections which were the flashpoint of the incident. This Pre-UN and early UN history is poignantly connected to the Jeju tragedy, as we will see, and is crucial for understanding its full significance. Sadly, however, this history is dimly understood. For the sake of understanding the full scope of moral responsibility for the Jeju tragedy, and for reconnecting to the values and virtues important for all people, this overlooked history must be brought to light.

Jeju 3.1

The Jeju tragedy was a seven year period of violence and brutality on Jeju Island, South Korea, that lasted from March 1, 1947 to September 21, 1954. Although the date of April 3, 1948 has dominated the narrative of the tragedy, I will show that focusing on the date of March 1, 1947 is more useful for both peace education purposes, and for the purpose of illuminating the responsibility of the United States and the International Community for this tragedy.

Indeed, the official report of the Jeju tragedy identifies the date of March 1, 1947 as its starting point,¹ but the tragedy has become, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with the date April 3, 1948. Koreans, for instance, refer to the tragedy that lasted for seven years simply as “sasam” (사삼) (meaning 4.3), and the official investigation report is entitled “The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report” (제주4.3사건진상조사보고서). April 3, 1948 has become the shorthand for the tragedy because it was on this day that the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) adopted the conscious decision to use violence against 12 of the 24 provincial police stations within Jeju.² The tactic was selected a means of

demonstrating opposition to the U.S. and United Nations' (UN) plan of administering elections in the Southern part of the country (which was controlled by United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK)), without also holding elections in the Northern part of the country (which was controlled by Soviet command).³

The plan of April 3, 1948 was, in part, a plan to use violence as a ‘last ditch effort’ to oppose these ‘South only’ elections.⁴ Prior attempts to use non-violent methods to demonstrate this opposition, such as a general strike, had failed. Focusing on the events of March 1, 1947, will help us to see how the events of that day led to the violent events from April 3, 1948 onward.⁵ On March 1, 1947, citizens of Jeju were celebrating an important commemorative holiday that is still recognized in Korea today. Known today as “Independence Movement Day,” this national holiday commemorates the events of March 1, 1919, and hence recalls a time before Korea was divided, but during its period colonization by Japan. On March 1, 1919, thousands of Korean citizens participated in a non-violent demonstration in which they simply read their own Declaration of Independence.⁶ The Declaration was signed by 33 Korean patriots, all of whom were arrested after reading the Declaration in front of Japanese officials.⁷ As part of the March 1, 1919 demonstration, copies of the Declaration were spread throughout the country: in each of the 322 districts, the Declaration was read to crowds of assembled people, and copies of the Declaration were delivered to every household and Japanese official.⁸ This demonstration was not only a show of Korean solidarity, but it was also an appeal to the world, and especially to the officials who were meeting in France to establish the details of the post World-War 1 order, including the creation of the League of Nations.⁹ The idea that the League would protect the value of self-determination of nations provided a ray of hope for Koreans who had been agitating to reclaim their independence from Japan since 1905.¹⁰ So in 1919, a massive, nation-wide

1) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report (English translation of the 2003 report issued by the National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident), Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), 123–139

2) A Guide to the History of the Jeju 4.3 Incident, Jeju Peace Foundation (2016), p.15. Available at: <http://www.jejupeaceacademy.com/manual.pdf>

3) A Guide to the History of the Jeju 4.3 Incident, Jeju Peace Foundation (2016), p.16. Available at:

<http://www.jejupeaceacademy.com/manual.pdf>

4) A Guide to the History of the Jeju 4.3 Incident, Jeju Peace Foundation (2016), p.16. Available at:

<http://www.jejupeaceacademy.com/manual.pdf>

5) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 123.

6) Clarence March Case, NON-VIOLENT COERCION (1923), p. 291. 288–295.

7) Korea's Appeal to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington Government Printing Office, 1922, p. 28.

8) Korea's Appeal to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington Government Printing Office, 1922, p. 28.

9) Clarence March Case, NON-VIOLENT COERCION (1923), p. 289–290.

10) See *infra* p. 8 for further discussion.

non-violent demonstration was organized. Seoul was the centerpiece of this demonstration, since foreign legations were headquartered there.¹¹ Arrangements were made for groups of thousands of citizens to visit each of the foreign consulate buildings.¹²

It was the commemoration of these events – in 1947 – which provided the “lead-up” to the Jeju tragedy. On March 1, 1947, as Jeju citizens were celebrating the 28 year anniversary of March 1, 1919, police killed 6 civilians, and injured an additional 6.¹³ The bloodshed was a response to the crowd’s outrage at the fact that a mounted policeman expressed no visible concern after his horse kicked a child who had suddenly jumped near the horse. Some in the crowd began to throw stones at the policeman, and the crowd followed him as he rode back to the police station.¹⁴ The police at the station responded with gunfire, leading to the death and injury of civilians, included the death of a 15 year old elementary school student.¹⁵

The police response to the shooting incident which was far from conciliatory and contributed to the downward spiral which led to the subsequent events on April 3, 1948, and thereafter. Instead of admitting its mistake and expressing remorse for the bystanders who had been injured and killed, the police insisted that the shooting was a necessary act of self-defense that was needed to maintain public order.¹⁶ Additionally, it was discovered that the shooters were members of the police reserves who had been brought to Jeju from the mainland, and this further aroused the ire of citizens.¹⁷ Following the shooting incident, a general strike – which included government employees – was organized on March 10, a first in Korean history.¹⁸ An investigation into the March 1 shooting incident conducted by the USAMGIK reads as follows:

A general strike is in progress in JEJU Island... the basic reason for the strike appears to be a hatred for the police because of police action during the 1 March riot.¹⁹

As the official investigation report indicates, the relationship between Jeju citizens and police

continued to deteriorate when participants in the strike were arrested.²⁰ The shooting incident, the lack of remorse by police, and the arrest of participants in the strike all led to the decision to attack the police stations on April 3, 1948. Indeed, anger and frustration at the police response to the March 1 shooting incident was one factor that led to this violence of April 3, but another force was the anger and frustration at the United States and international community for allowing South only elections. The fear, and right it was, was that this would further entrench the division of the Korean peninsula. So on one pamphlet discussing the events of April 3, we read:

Fellow citizens! Dear parents and siblings! Today on April 3, your sons, daughters and younger brothers and sisters rose up in arms against a South-only election and government and for the reunification and independence of our homeland and for the complete liberation of our people!²¹

On October 17, 1947, the United States submitted a detailed plan to the UN calling for elections to be held no later than March 31, 1947.²² That original plan failed since elections were not held until May 10, 1948. At any rate, the US plan for elections well known by the time that April 3, 1948 rolled around. So there were at least two streams of anger that were behind the events of April 3, 1948. On the one hand, there was the anger at the police for their insensitivity to the events of March 1, 1947, and on the other there was anger at the United States and UN for pushing forward South-only elections. These two streams merged into the sad events that followed.

March 1, 1947 as a Peace Education Tool

Although March 1, 1947 was a breaking point connected to plenty of “negative history”, there is much to be gained by focusing attention on this date. The events which led to the shooting incident on March 1, 1947 provide an excellent focal point for discussions about non-violent conflict resolution and therefore the shooting incident should be explored for peace education purposes, especially as Jeju Island pursues its vision of becoming a “Peace Island.” Among the questions that can be explored for peace education purposes are: Did the mounted policeman know that his horse had kicked a child?; Was it an accident?; How should have he

11) Clarence March Case, NON-VIOLENT COERCION (1923), p. 290.

12) Clarence March Case, NON-VIOLENT COERCION (1923), p. 290-291.

13) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 132-133.

14) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 132.

15) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 133.

16) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 134.

17) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 133.

18) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 123.

19) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 147.

20) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 152.

21) A Guide to the History of the Jeju 4.3 Incident, Jeju Peace Foundation (2016), p.16. Available at: <http://www.jejupeaceacademy.com/manual.pdf>

22) See John Price, The ‘Cat’s Paw’: Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 85, no.2 (2004), pp 297-324 at p. 303

responded?; Should the crowd have responded differently to the events?; How should have the police responded? The official report of 2013, which discusses this incident in detail, is based on both testimonies from individuals as well as articles from the Jeju Shinbo, and it would be a valuable academic experience to have students explore this evidence for more detailed information about the incident.

Interestingly, the date that marks the end of the Jeju Massacre – September 21, 1954 – is also valuable for peace education purposes. On September 21, 1954, Shin Sang-muk, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Jeju Police Force, reopened Mt. Halla – the highest mountain in South Korea (located on Jeju Island).²³ Since 1948, Mt. Halla was deemed “rebel territory” and was separated from the rest of an island with a fortress. On September 21, 1954, Commissioner Shin ended this division and ‘reunified’ the Island. Ironically, since 1981, September 21 has been recognized as the UN International Day of Peace, because this day coincides with the opening of the UN General Assembly. In 2013, the UN Secretary General dedicated September 21 to Peace education.²⁴

It is striking that the official start and end dates of the Jeju tragedy are connected to peace history. The pre UN date of March 1, 1919, and the post UN (and post Korean War) date of September 21, 1954 are meaningful focal points through which we can weave a rich thread of peace history. Placing the Jeju tragedy within this broader historical context provides an enriched understanding which enables to appreciate how the incident is linked not only Korea’s peace history, but also the peace history of the international community. And as we will see, when we connect the Jeju incident to the history of the UN, the tragedy can more fully appreciated as an incident which raises interesting questions about international ethics.

The United States and the United Nations in 1947

Focusing on March 1, 1947, and really the year of 1947, is valuable because it directs attention to the events that led to April 3, 1948 and thereafter. Apart from the events in Korea surrounding the commemoration of March 1, important events were also happening at the UN at this time. The UN was in its infancy in 1947 (the UN Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945). And as

1945 drew to an end, Great Britain, The United States, and The Soviet Union met in Moscow from December 16–26, 1945, to discuss post-war issues in the Far East, including the problem of Korea. Among other things, the three countries agreed to: “the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles;” “the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the “protracted Japanese domination in Korea;” and the establishment of “a provisional Korean democratic government.”²⁵ The so called “Moscow Agreement” also provided for the establishment of United States command in the South, and Soviet command in the North, to achieve these objectives.²⁶

In 1947, this process of implementing the terms of the Moscow Agreement broke down and General Hodge – Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea – ended talks with the Soviet Union on the re-establishment Korean independence.²⁷ Until this time, the independence of Korea was not considered by the United Nations. That changed in 1947.²⁸ At these early UN meetings in 1947, The Soviet Union proposed that the Korean people should be allowed to send “elected representatives” to the UN in order to properly deal with the problem. This proposal was countered by both the United States and Great Britain: The United States responded that a temporary UN commission should go to Korea, and Great Britain (and several other countries) argued that the Soviet plan would prolong the issue.²⁹ Indeed, one should wonder why Great Britain thought that the U.S. proposal of a UN commission to go to Korea would be any more expeditious that having Korea’s participation at the UN. Oddly, representatives from the Southern, U.S. zone were not allowed to participate in this debate, but they were allowed to look on from the press box, as can be seen from an official UN photo.³⁰ In light of the disagreement about whether Koreans should come and deliberate with the UN, or whether the UN should go to Koreans, the Soviet Union proposed that Soviet and American troops leave Korea, thereby “leaving Koreans free to work

23) The Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report, Jeju 4.3 Peace Foundation (2013), p. 628. September 21, 1954 also began the refugee resettlement program. See p. 449.

24) <http://www.un.org/en/events/peaceday/2013/sgmessage.shtml>

25) Communiqué on The Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Ministers, Dec. 27, 1945, pp 1346. Available at: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-1341.pdf>.

26) *Id.* at 1346–1347.

27) Hodge Puts Korean Case in Laps of ‘Higher Ups’, *The Knickerbocker News*, Feb. 25., 1947.

28) On October 17, 1947, the United States submitted a detailed plan to the UN calling for elections to be held no later than March 31, 1947. See John Price, *The ‘Cat’s Paw’: Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea*, *The Canadian Historical Review*, vol. 85, no.2 (2004), pp 297–324 at p. 303

29) *UN Wrangle Over Korea*, *The Advocate* (Australia), October 31, 1947, p. 1.

30) See <http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?id=187/187746>

out their own future.”³¹

Later in 1947, the United States proposed the creation of machinery in the UN – The Interim Committee on Peace and Security (ICPS) and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) – to solve the problem of Korean independence for the peninsula as whole. The ICPS was proposed on September 17, 1947 as a “standing committee” of the General Assembly which dealt with issues of peace and security “without infringing on the jurisdiction of the Security Council.”³² The ICPS was also referred to as the ‘little assembly.’³³ The UNTCOK was formed on November 14, 1947, with a mandate to supervise free and open elections, assist in the withdrawal of the occupying forces, and guide Korea to full independence.³⁴ 9 nations served on the UNTCOK: Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic.³⁵ The Soviet Union refused to solve the Korean problem via the UN, and notably refused to recognize the ICPS and the UNTCOK. Ukraine, therefore, did not participate in the activities of the UNTCOK.

The ICPS and the UNTCOK were two separate tools – pieces of bureaucratic machinery – which the United States created to solve the problem of Korea the way that it wanted to. Despite the refusal of the Soviet Union to cooperate with and utilize this machinery, the U.S. pressed ahead with its vision of solving the problem of Korea by using the ICPS and the UNTCOK, jointly. First, the UNTCOK visited Korea, establishing its base of operations, unsurprisingly, in the US zone only. After surveying various parts of Korea in this zone, UNTCOK asked the ICPS whether it should proceed with elections given the fact that only the South – and a rather divided South – would be participating. The ICPS, “under strong U.S. pressure” answered “Yes.”³⁶ As

we now know, the insistence on elections in the South only was not an effective way of returning Korea to its status quo ante prior to the colonization of Japan. The decision led to tremendous bloodshed spilled during the Jeju tragedy, the Korean War, and the country remains divided to this day.

The Moral Relevance of History

Thus far, we have seen how shifting focus away from the date of April 3, 1948 – and to the earlier date of March 1, 1947 – and to the year of 1947 – helps to provide a richer context of the Jeju tragedy. Not only does this shift enable us to connect the Jeju tragedy to March 1, 1919, but it also enables us to see how the US commandeered UN machinery to solve the problem of Korea according to its own scheme, without meaningfully involving the Korean people. And if we now extend our attention to ‘international relations’ involving Korea prior to the UN, the story becomes sadder still. Prior to World War 2 – indeed prior to World War I, Korea had developed a clear record of appealing to the world – in an attempt to seek assistance from Japan’s domination. We have already discussed how the events of March 1, 1919 were one such appeal when thousands of Korean citizens assembled in front of the various foreign legations in Seoul.³⁷ But there were appeals well before that historic day in 1919. By 1919, numerous Western countries: The United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, Denmark and Belgium all had legally binding treaties with the Kingdom of Korea.³⁸ As such, these countries were legally obliged to provide assistance to Korea in the event that another country, such as Japan, interfered with its interests. Many countries had a provision such as that of Article 1, found in the Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation that that United States signed with Korea in 1882.³⁹ Article 1 reads:

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their respective governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.⁴⁰

37) See supra p. 9.

38) See Korea’s Appeal to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington Government Printing Office, 1922, p. 17.

39) Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Korea and the United States (May 22, 1882), Art. 1. Available at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/June_2012/1-1822%20Treaty.pdf

40) Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation between Korea and the United States (May 22, 1882), Art. 1. Available at: http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/June_2012/1-1822%20Treaty.pdf

31) UN Ponders Korean Fate, The Stanford Daily, vol. 112, issue 23, October 29, 1947.

32) George Marshall, Speech to the United Nations General Assembly of September 17, 1947, p 7. Available at: <http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wpcontent/uploads/sites/16/2015/03/47.09.17-Speech-to-UN-Gen-Assby.doc>

33) David. C. Wainhouse, The Interim Committee or the “Little Assembly”, Documents and State Papers, Vol. 1, No. 3, June 1948, pp. 159-190.

34) See Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation United Nations Commission on Korea, Available at: <http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-rieng.asp?IntlOpld=266&CdnOpld=314>

35) See John Price, The ‘Cat’s Paw’: Canada and the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 85, no.2 (2004), pp 297-324 at p. 303

36) William A. Taylor, The United Nations in The Ashgate Research Companion to the Korean War (Donald W. Boose Jr. and James I Matray (eds.)), pp. 97-108 at 98. See also The United Nations Report of the New Zealand Delegation on the First Part of the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly held at Paris, 21 September to 12 December 1948. pp. 52-59.

Indeed, Korea's earliest appeal to invoke this provision was in 1905, and hence well before March 1, 1919. King Gojong requested this assistance because Japan had illegally imposed the 1905 Eulsa Treaty on Korea, which made Korea a protectorate of Japan. The United States was obliged, pursuant to Article 1 above to offer its 'good offices' in order to resolve the issue between Korea and Japan, thereby allowing Korea to regain its independence. In late 1905, U.S. citizen Homer Hulbert was appointed as a special envoy by King Gojong. Hulbert journeyed from Korea to Washington D.C., to remind the U.S. State Department of its legal obligations to Korea. Hulbert, however, was ignored by the U.S. State Department until it was 'too late' for the U.S. interfere with Japan's business.⁴¹ Naturally, this outraged Hulbert and he spent his entire life advocating for Korean independence. Throughout his life Hulbert remained critical of the U.S. for failing to meet its legal and moral obligations to Korea.

Korea's 1905 appeal to the U.S. began a trend of appealing to other countries which were, pursuant to their treaty obligations, required to assist Korea. Koreans tried to gain a hearing at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, at the Peace Conference in 1919,⁴² and even at the Disarmament Conference in 1921.⁴³ But these appeals went unheeded.

This history of course was not acknowledged by the U.S. or any other country as the world was deciding the fate of Korea at the UN in its early years. The proposal of the ICPS and the UNTCOK completely ignored the repeated appeals that Korea had made not only to the United States, but also to the international community as a whole. Also ignored was the fact that a number of countries had promised, via treaty, to offer assistance to Korea to offer assistance in its hour of need.

This earlier history has moral relevance not only because it reveals the "unclean hands" of the international community, but also because it is relevant to the issue of causality and hence to the issue of responsibility for the Jeju tragedy. Granted, the causal story of the Jeju incident is complex, and the decision of the SKLP to use violence on April 3, 1948, as well as the heavy handed and insensitive approach of the police, are among several relevant factors. But when considering liability purposes, if we use what is called a "substantial factor" approach to causation, we can see how this earlier history points to other relevant causal factors.⁴⁴

According to the substantial factor approach, if an event S is a substantial factor in the occurrence of another event E, then S is the cause of E. This approach acknowledges that an event may have several 'contributing factors' to its occurrence, all of which are causes. A 'substantial factor' is one which "lead[s] reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility."⁴⁵ With this definition in mind, let us recall the remarks of Phillip Jessup, part of the U.S. delegation to the UN and member of the ICPS, who, in a speech defending the ICPS notably failed to include the earlier morally relevant history that we have been reviewing:

Our concern is the Korean people and the restoration of their freedom and independence. This is the desire of the Korean people themselves. This is the objective the United States pursued through the period of the defeat of the Japanese, through the Cairo Declaration, through the Joint U. S.-U. S. S. R. Commission on Korea, through the suggestion for a Four Power discussion, and finally, through the debates in the General Assembly itself.⁴⁶

Note that although the United States' concern is for "the restoration of [Korean people's] freedom and independence," there is no acknowledgement that the United States (as well as others) contributed to the problem that they were now seeking to solve. Surely the inaction and the failure to assist Korea in its hour of need (prior to World War II) was a substantial factor – and hence a cause of – Korea's loss of freedom and independence. Further, and moving closer in time to the Jeju incident, we should ask: "was the US/UN decision to conduct South-only elections a substantial factor in the events of 4.3 and the ensuing violence"? It is no stretch of the imagination to think that 'reasonable men' will answer this question in the affirmative.

My purpose in reviewing the history prior to April 3, 1948, is simply to make the case that there are other relevant factors that should be considered, and especially as we think about the dimensions of responsibility for the Jeju tragedy. Indeed, the repeated refusal of others to come to Korea's aid, combined with the response to the March 1, 1947 shooting incident and subsequent strike – makes the decision of the SKLP to use violence foreseeable. The deeper historical context helps us to understand the outrage that the crowd felt beginning on March 1, 1947. There was undeniably a "long train of abuses and usurpations"⁴⁷ to which

41) See Appeals to Public for Emperor of Korea, Envoy Complains That Roosevelt Won't Restrain Japan, New York Times, December 14, 1905.

42) See supra, page 3.

43) See Korea's Appeal to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington Government Printing Office, (1922) and Clarence March Case, NON-VIOLENT COERCION (1923), pp. 288-295.

44) Restatement (Second) Torts § 431 (1965).

45) Restatement (Second) Torts § 431 (1965), cmt. a.

46) Philip C. Jessup, The Question of Korea in the U.N. Interim Committee, Documents and State Papers (United States Department of State), vol. 1, no. 2, May 1948 pp. 92-98, at p. 92.

47) Declaration of Independence of the United States, July 4, 1776.

some felt obliged to “throw off.”⁴⁸ The United States of course should have remembered this history – and its own role in creating the problem of Korea – when it formulated and implemented its plan in the UN. But there is no evidence that it did. Perhaps now it should.

If we take the rhetoric of the United States seriously, the United States is the people. The UN Charter also recognizes the power of “peoples”. And so while it is of course important for state officials to understand this morally relevant history, it is perhaps even more important for it to be transmitted to ordinary people. By shifting focus away from the date of 4.3, and towards the date of March 1, 1947, the deeper forces: the repeated nonviolent appeals of the Korean people for independence, and the breaking of treaties and oaths by numerous Western powers – enrich our understanding of Jeju tragedy. And when we reckon with and understand these deeper causal forces, we are more able to move darkness to brightness.

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48) Declaration of Independence of the United States, July 4, 1776.