Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding: Towards positive peace in a society that endured conflict

Olivier Sempiga
(American Graduate School in Paris, France)

Abstract

After the conflict, war or hostilities there is an urgent need to rebuild the society for sustainable peace and prosperity. There is need to work for positive peace by removing all sorts of cultural and structural violence and injustices. As such, positive peace paves way to true reconciliation, justice, healing of both victims and society members and if possible forgiveness. Even when there is no longer conflict, leaders in a society should never lose focus on attending to the victims who suffered during the conflict. Constant peacebuilding and peacemaking should be done in societies that suffered conflict. As we will see in the article, Gacaca and Bulteok experiences are examples of approaches that have helped Rwanda and Jeju Island respectively in their quest for lasting peace and a just society. This article aims at explaining peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches and how they are used by individuals, nations, and organizations to build peaceful societies. The article will give a realist critique of these approaches.

Key words: Conflict, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding, Towards positive Peace, Forgiveness, Gacaca, Bulteok
**Introduction**

When a society experiences a tragedy like the one Jeju Island experienced between 1947 and 1954 or like the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda, the society is hurt, crippled and at times destroyed. Society members get long lasting scars that take many years to heal and mend. The society loses energetic and intelligent members that were supposed to build it and give it direction. In some ways, the society loses track or direction. The healing process to the victims is a delicate process that has to be done with fairness. Justice has to be done to those who lost their loved ones and all those who suffered the consequences of a conflict in one way or the other. After the conflict, war or hostilities there is an urgent need to rebuild the society for sustainable peace and prosperity. There is need to work for positive peace by removing all sorts of cultural and structural violence and injustices. As such, positive peace paves way to true reconciliation, justice, healing of both victims and society members and if possible forgiveness. Even when there is no longer conflict, leaders in a society should never lose focus on attending to the victims who suffered during the conflict. Constant peacebuilding and peacemaking should be done in societies that suffered conflict. As we will see in the article, Gacaca and Bulteok experiences are examples of approaches that have helped Rwanda and Jeju Island respectively in their quest for lasting peace and a just society. This article aims at explaining peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding approaches and how they are used by individuals, nations, and organizations to build peaceful societies. The article will give a realist critique of these approaches.

**Peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding processes in a society**

Before we delve into the explanation of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding processes in a society we need to explain the concept of conflict. Conflicts are dynamic as they escalate and deescalate and are constituted by a complex interplay of attitudes and behaviours. Galtung suggests that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A), and behavior (B) at its vertices (Figure 1). Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between the conflict parties generated by a mis-match between social values and social structure. In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests, and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict, it is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. Attitude includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Behaviour can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterised by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As a conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation as parties’ interests come into conflict or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then organize around this structure, to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behavior. (Quoted in Ramsbotham 2016, 12) Conflicts can take long periods of time to gestate unnoticed before they suddenly erupt into overt violence. Galtung also distinguishes between direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). We end direct violence by changing conflict behaviours, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 12–4) Galtung distinguishes negative from positive peace, the former characterised by the absence of direct violence, the latter by the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well. Negative peace can be associated with the more limited but better defined ‘minimalist’ agenda of preventing war, and in particular nuclear war. (Quoted in Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 47) Positive peace, in contrast, includes the key ideas of legitimacy and justice. An unjust structure or relationship in this terminology is not a peaceful one. In order to achieve positive peace, therefore, injustice must be removed. (14) Omeje 2008 argues that direct violence can be resolved by changing conflict behaviours, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. (70) With reference to the conflict triangle, it can be suggested that peace-making aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peace-keeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peace-building tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict. (Galtung, 1996, 112)
A. Peacekeeping

Galtung 1996 asserts that peacekeeping to the interposition of international armed forces to separate the armed forces of belligerents, often now associated with civil tasks such as monitoring and policing and supporting humanitarian intervention. (112) Peacekeeping is appropriate at three points on the escalation scale: to contain violence and prevent it from escalating to war; to limit the intensity, geographical spread and duration of war once it has broken out; and to consolidate a ceasefire and create space for reconstruction after the end of a war (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 173). Peacekeeping operations that took place during the Cold War period were meant to monitor borders and establish buffer zones after the agreement of ceasefires. The missions were typically composed of lightly armed national troop contingents from small and neutral UN member states. This was first-generation peacekeeping. The numerical growth of peacekeeping operations during the 1990s was accompanied by a fundamental change in their nature, their function and their composition. This was second-generation peacekeeping. First and second generation peacekeeping missions were based on: the consent of the conflict parties; political neutrality (not taking sides); the non-use of force except in self-defence; legitimacy (sanctioned by and accountable to the Security Council advised by the secretary general). (175–6)

As time went by, the composition of post-cold war peacekeeping operations became more diverse and complex: peacekeepers were drawn from a wider variety of sources (military, civilian police and diplomatic), nation and cultures. Second-generation peacekeeping was multilateral, multidimensional and multinational/multicultural. The dominant contributors were no longer the small neutral nations traditionally associated with peacekeeping (Canadians, Irish and Scandinavians, for example), but increasingly some of the Security Council P5 countries and, above all, nations in Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India) and Africa (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana). Altogether, since the early days of UN peace operations, over 130 member states have contributed military and police personnel and in total 1 million personnel have served under the UN flag. Many hoped that the UN could now at last fulfill its original potential. (176) The confidence in peacekeeping, at its height in the mid-1990s, began to wane in the closing years of the decade and into the early years of the twenty-first century. The number of troops deployed, the number of deployments and the budget committed to peacekeeping all declined (although not the number of troop-providing countries). Peacekeepers faced seemingly insurmountable problems and were frequently exposed as the genocide in Rwanda shows. A UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) already in Rwanda, but with its force numbers severely reduced, was largely powerless to prevent the genocide against Tutsis, despite the pleas of General Romeo Dallaire — its force commander. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 176–7)

During the early 1990s, in the first flush of the expansion of second-generation peacekeeping, it had seemed that UN peacekeeping nevertheless retained its essential character: the context was one of supporting already achieved peace agreements, and it was assumed that they would be short term: the operations were non-forcible: the missions were integrated under the UN: they were seen to be clearly from UN peace enforcement, as exemplified in the 1991 reversal of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Not one of these criteria survived into the third-generation peacekeeping unscathed: first, in the context of new wars, the situation is no longer one of clear-cut post agreement consensus, nor are many of the interventions short term. Second, in response to the weakness of most second-generation missions, the UN Brahimi report asked for much more robust forces capable of deterring aggression, and a number of national defence academies also planned accordingly. Third, third generation peace operations came increasingly to be mounted not under a UN aegis, but by regional security organizations or coalitions of the willing and capable, such as NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. Fourth, even the distinction between UN-authorized and UN-managed non-forcible peacekeeping operations, the one hand (for example, the ONUMOZ mission to support a peace agreement in Mozambique in 1992), and UN authorized but non-UN-managed peace enforcement operations, on the other was eroded, as in Kossovo. In some cases forcible interveners sought no more than posthumous UN endorsement, sometimes retrospectively (181–2). UN peacekeeping has grown enormously since the late 1980s: missions have increased by a factor of three: military and police numbers tenfold: civilians on mission elevenfold: and countries contributing to UN peacekeeping fivefold. The annual budget for UN peacekeeping has also grown significantly over time, but even the 2014 level, at about $7 billion, is less than half of 1 percent of world military expenditures (182). UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to conflict but not neutral in the execution of their mandate, while although force must be used in a restrained fashion, it may be employed in circumstances other than self-defence: peacekeepers may use force to protect themselves, their mandate and groups identified by the mandate (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 188). Peacekeeping clears way to end violent conflict and hence to
Peacebuilding, inter alia, consists of postwar long-term relationships between conflictants. In the post–Cold War period, from 1990 up to 2005, 147 conflicts terminated, with 18% ending in a peace agreement, 20 per cent in a ceasefire but no peace agreement, 14 per cent in victory for one side, and 48 per cent in other outcomes. The post–Cold war period has thus seen a significant increase in the proportion of conflicts ending in peace agreements and a sharp reduction in the number ending in victory, but other endings, such as the end of violence with no agreement, significant peace agreements, as well as some less well-known ones. Conflicts continue to show a bewildering pattern of ceasefires, temporary agreements and occasionally permanent settlements (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 200). The end of the Cold war was a significant factor in transforming the context of many conflicts and contributed to the ending of a number of later conflicts. A notable factor was the reduction in the capacity or willingness of external powers to support fighting factions. (208) The decrease in conflicts is encouraging because it reflects the success of peace-making efforts and interventions at the regional, continental and international levels. (Karbo 2008, 128–9) Mediation and third–party intervention are key part of peacemaking. Ramsbotham et al. 2016 argue that international mediation has become an increasingly crowded field, with international organizations, governments and non–governmental organizations all involved (214). The obstacles to a peace process are almost always formidable. The parties to a violent conflict aim to win, and so they are locked in a process of strategic interaction which makes them acutely sensitive to prospects for gain and loss. Any concession that involves abandoning political ground, any withdrawal from a long–held position, is therefore resisted bitterly (221). The strategic risks inherent in peacemaking are illustrated by the ever presence of a strategic dilemma. The way out of this dilemma is for both parties to agree to a move together to the option of peaceful settlement and so reach an option they each prefer to continued conflict. In order to do this, the parties have to create sufficient trust, or guarantees, that they will commit themselves to what they promise (221).

C. Peacebuilding

According to Galtung 1996 peace–building underpins the work of peace–making and peacemaking by addressing structural issues and the long–term relationships between conflictants. (112) Peacebuilding, inter alia, consists of postwar reconstruction. Intervention as the first part of postwar reconstruction is characterized by control armed factions: supervise disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation: help restructure and integrate new national armed forces: begin de-mining: reconstitute courts and prisons: break grip of organized crime: train police: promote human rights and punish abuse: many cases oversee new constitution, election, reconstructing of civil administration subject to local conditions: prevent intimidation: provide humanitarian relief: restore essential services: limit exploitation of movable primary resources by spoilers: overcome initial distrust between groups: monitor and use media to support peace process: protect vulnerable populations: supervise initial return of refugees (251).

In his An Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros–Ghali links peace implementation to peacebuilding which he defines as ‘actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (1992, 11). The main factor in conflict recurrence is political exclusion and conversely that inclusive settlements form the main way of avoiding recurrence. If we interpret the recurrence of war as due to the security dilemma in which unreconciled groups find themselves, it is clear that, if excluded groups can come to be included in governing and security institutions, the security dilemma is likely to be mitigated. Similarly, strong institutions are negatively associated with civil war recurrence. Consequently, strengthening legal and political institutions is a primary route to getting countries out of the conflict trap. Raising income levels and reducing horizontal inequalities have similar effects. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 161–2) Boutros–Ghali’s broad definition determines success in a peace process in terms of long–term measures to address the political, economic and social underlining causes of war. Kabia 2009 insists that peacebuilding consists of two different phases: transitional and consolidation. The transitional phase involves efforts aimed at preventing a relapse into violence (negative peace), whereas the consolidation phase deals with the removal of structural and cultural violence (positive peace). The transitional phase represents the most urgent tasks facing peacebuilders. (162) As peacebuilding aims at preventing a relapse into violence, it includes measures such as compromises and trade–offs to factional leaders. In this context, the transitional phase is about who gets what in the post–war period. This short–term aim of preventing violence is often at odds with, and may adversely affect the long–term goal of building sustainable peace. However, despite this dark side, this phase still remains vital to peacebuilding since post–war reconstruction can only be possible in a violence–free
environment. (162)

Taking a Galtungian approach, peace-building as a concept incorporates the goals of both negative peace, or the absence of physical violence, and positive peace, which refers to absence of structural violence. Peacebuilding seeks to address the root causes and effects of conflict by restoring broken relationships, promoting reconciliation, institution-building and political reform, as well as facilitating economic transformation. In this regard, peace-building aims to promote long-term stability and justice, as well as the promotion of good governance, rebuilding of state infrastructures and rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Overall, peace-building is a long-term process that occurs before, during and after conflict has slowed down or abated. External interventions in peace-building initiatives have been intrinsically linked to state-building efforts in developing countries. (Karbo 2008, 115)

Peace-building, therefore, may involve a number of activities, including conflict prevention, conflict management, negotiation, mediation, peacemaking, advocacy, humanitarian assistance, emergency management, development work and post-conflict reconstruction. In other words, peace-building is concerned with the longer-term reconstruction and development of society so as to prevent deadly conflict or the re-emergence of armed conflict. It also looks at the structural conditions underlying the manifestations of violence, including the discrimination faced by vulnerable groups such as women and ethnic minorities in any phase during a conflict situation. Ultimately, peace-building aims to enhance and promote human security, a concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, rule of law, sustainable development and equitable access to resources (economic and environmental security). Karbo 2008 goes on to argue that the central task of peace-building is to create positive peace, a stable social equilibrium in which the initiation of new disputes does not escalate into violence and war, a situation where the structural and cultural forces of violence are addressed. (116) Peace-building is not limited to the so-called concrete markers of peace, such as the signing of agreements, or the cessation of hostilities. It is an ongoing, multifaceted and holistic concept that should be tied to society’s social, cultural, political, spiritual, economic and developmental fabrics. Conflict transformation assumes that the consequences of conflict can be modified or transformed so that relationships and social structures improve as a result of conflict instead of being harmed by it (Lederach 1999, 35). In addition, Lederach sees the need to rebuild destroyed relationships, focusing on reconciliation within society and the strengthening of society’s peace-building potential. He argues that one of the most important needs is for peace-builders to ‘find ways to understand peace as a change process based on relationship building.’ (35)

Effective and sustainable peace-building is often based on the empowerment of communities. Effective peace-building moves away from what Ramsbotham et al. (2005) refer to as ‘simple’ one-dimensional peace-building to peace-building frameworks that take a longer and broader developmental approach: an approach that is called ‘integrated peace-building’. In this approach, peace-building is carried out with a long-range view of transforming relationships within communities and their members, through conflict prevention, vision and transformation. (Karbo 2008, 125–6) When wars have ended, post-conflict peacebuilding is vital. Successful peacebuilding requires the deployment of peacekeepers with the right mandates and sufficient capacity to deter would-be spoilers: funds for demobilization and disarmament built into peacekeeping budgets: a new trust fund to fill critical gaps in rehabilitation and reintegration of combatants, as well as other early reconstruction tasks: and a focus on building state institutions and capacity, especially in the rule of law sector. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 236) Statebuilding is a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions. (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1–2)

The difficulty that the intervention phase encounters is the issue of governance that is lacking in a country after a devastating war. Moreover, there are enemies of reconstruction processes—especially where wars are ongoing and parties see the interveners as combatants. In peace process, the spoilers range from ideologically implacable enemies, through disappointed political interests, to unscrupulous exploiters who profited from the previous dispensation and are reluctant to accept its demise (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 254). Absence of war on its own (negative peace) can obscure deep injustices which make a mockery of peace, and, if unaddressed, contain the seeds of future violent conflict (48). Despite the differences above mentioned, the three approaches usually go together as the hourglass model below shows. They are so much nested that it is sometimes difficult to point out when one begins and the other one ends as the nested figure below shows. For example we saw that peacebuilding includes peacekeeping. Postwar reconstruction is made up of the negative tasks of ending continuing violence and preventing a relapse into war, on the one hand, and the positive task of constructing a self-sustaining peace, on the other. In the words of the 2000 Brahimi Report: while
peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers' support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders' work. In other words, the negative and positive tasks are mutually interdependent. Yet they are at the same time in mutual tension (248).

The way peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping are useful in conflict resolution

The end of the Cold War, especially the 1990s and the early 2000s, coincidentally witnessed an accentuation in Africa of the incidence of intra-state conflicts – horizontally between different socio-ethnic and cultural aggregates within a national territory, and vertically, between groups who feel excluded and marginalized from existing power structures on the one hand, and the central authority on the other. (Omeje 2008, 68) Traditionally, the task of conflict resolution has been seen as helping parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum (Self’s gain is Other’s loss) to re-perceive it as a non-zero-sum conflict (in which both may gain or both may lose), and then to assist parties to move in the positive sum direction. There are various possible outcomes of the conflict between parties A and B. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 20) What are to count as the relevant conflicts? Conflict resolution analysts have traditionally included all levels of conflict from intrapersonal conflict through to international conflict, and all stages of conflict escalation and deescalation. Contemporary conflict will be mainly 'internally' generated and that interstate war of the classic kind can be virtually ignored. This is in marked contrast to most quantitative studies of major armed conflict and war since 1945. (68)

Peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping carried out by international organizations would include the following: the provision of security, the rule of law (including a codified and promulgated body of laws with a reasonably effective police and justice system), basic services (including emergency relief, support for the poorest, and essential healthcare), and at least a rudimentary ability to formulate and implement budget plans and to collect revenue through taxation. (256) The phase of normalization and afterwards (Figure 2) is characterized by demilitarized politics: societal security; transformed cultures of violence; non-politicized judiciary and police; respect for individual and minority rights; reduction in organized crime; peaceful transition of power via democratic elections; development of civil society with genuine political community; equitable integration of local and national politics; development in the long-term interest of citizens from all backgrounds; depoliticization of social divisions; the healing of psychological wounds; progress towards gender equality; education towards long-term reconciliation; integration into cooperative and equitable regional/global structures. (260) Usually there are all sorts of international organizations that specialize in one or two of the above areas. For example after the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda, UNDP helped in reconciliation and justice projects while UNHCR assisted in the repatriation of refugees. Similarly, JRS (Jesuit Refugee Service) helped with education project.

Omeje 2008 asserts that the state especially in Africa is a key protagonist in conflicts and therefore cannot be trusted to play the role of a third-party umpire capable of bringing an effective resolution of the conflict. The vast majority of recent state-centred conflicts in Africa, especially since the end of the Cold War, have been insurgencies and civil wars. (75) As mentioned above strong institutions are negatively associated with civil war recurrence. This suggests
that strengthening legal and political institutions is a primary route to getting countries out of the conflict trap. Collier et al. argue for the importance of raising income levels and reducing horizontal inequalities. (Quoted in Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 161–2) International organizations are well aware that without effective governmental institutions, deeper peacebuilding is not sustainable, while the fact that governmental institutions must at the same time be perceived as legitimate and accountable in order to be effective reintroduces considerations of wider peacebuilding and reconciliation (249). International organizations focus on the main factors that are likely to reduce the risk of civil wars. These are stable governance, economic development, political and economic inclusiveness, the mitigation of horizontal inequalities, and the protection of human rights. Turning to governance first, there has been a clear finding that changes of regime tend to be associated with violent conflict, so political stability is a preventive factor. There is evidence that settled democracies are less prone to civil wars than other regime types. Stable autocracies also experience relatively few civil wars. It is semi–democracies and transitional regimes that exhibit the highest incidence. (155–6) With regard to economic factors, a strong relationship has been found between low per capita income and the risk of civil war, indicating that inclusive development and a sufficient level of prosperity help to prevent violent conflict. In the economic sphere, protracted conflict tends to be associated with patterns of underdevelopment or uneven development. There is a correlation between absolute levels of economic underdevelopment and violent conflict (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 130) Globally, both policy reform and aid are important motors of economic growth. They are complementary aid is more effective in a better policy environment, and policy reform is more effective in conjunction with large aid inflows. In post–conflict situations, the complementary role of aid and policy reform is even more important. Similarly, abuse of human rights is widely recognized as an early warning indicator of incipient conflict. Human rights violations are both a trigger for escalation and a result of protracted fighting. Consequently there are many international organizations that monitor and evaluate human rights abuses in third world countries like International Amnesty and Human Rights Watch (156).

Following other conflict resolution analysts Edward Azar identified deprivation of human needs as the underlying source of protracted social conflict. Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict. In particular, he cites security needs, development needs, political access needs, and identity needs (cultural and religious expression). (117) Governance and the state’s role are the critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity group needs: Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs. Whereas in Western liberal theory the state is an aggregate of individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts among the constituent parts, treating all members of the political community as legally equal citizens, this is not empirically what happens in most parts of the world, particularly in newer and less stable states where political authority tends to be monopolized by the dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups which use the state to maximize their interests at the expense of others. (118)

As the Cold War ended, United Nations (UN) peacebuilding, humanitarian and donor assistance, World Bank and UNDP programming, and many other international institutions and experts began to develop a project of dealing with conflict not only through formal conflict termination, but through the (re)construction of the state in a specifically liberal form. Further, programming also sought to promote free markets, making the project neoliberal as well. The response to any problems that have emerged has tended to focus on refinement of programming, rather than a broader questioning of the model itself. This project developed a peacebuilding consensus, a loose agreement on peacebuilding among a wide range of actors. (Richmond 2011, 45) Pulver 2011 contends that UN peacekeeping operations are frequently deployed in settings in which justice systems, along with almost all other state institutions, have completely ceased to function. Those that do operate are likely to do so in violation of applicable national and international standards. These justice systems have generally suffered years of neglect prior to, and during, the conflict. Often the number of qualified legal professionals available to serve in the criminal justice system is too small to meet the needs of host countries. (61) Pulver goes on to say that it is now well accepted that strengthening rule of law institutions can be vital to peace and security in the post–conflict setting, and is an important aspect of the work of United Nations peacekeeping operations. (65) The liberal peacebuilding consensus often depends on third parties imposing the choice of political and institutional forms (the adoption of free markets, elections, human rights, and so on) on all disputants. Sides or actors which fail to accept this become excluded economically and politically, and suffer from the impact of the political and economic asymmetries such exclusion produces. Where local
actors cannot be induced to cooperate, external actors take on more governance functions. Richmond 2011 has argued that this may not be a perfect solution but that less interventionist measures, in some cases, are worse alternatives, despite the fact that there is strong evidence that conflict zones are ill-suited to democratization processes (at least during short-term transitional periods). (47)

The Brahimi Report demonstrates that democratization has become an essential element of peacebuilding. Experience demonstrates that the international community is only prepared to invest in the installation of a liberal democracy resting on human rights, humanitarianism, an agreement on what constitutes development, and a marketized economy. This means that while there is strong external support for this sort of intervention, internal consent arises through particularistic political, social, and economic practices that may not survive such an intervention. The promotion of the rule of law and other democratic principles is subject to the same critiques that have been levied at the other aspects of the liberal peace. Nonetheless, peacebuilding has been accused of promoting as technically superior western models into local political arrangements in polities emerging from conflict. But this may often be at the expense of local culture, society, welfare, and indigenous notions of political, social, and economic organization. (Richmond 2011, 47)

Furthermore, peacebuilding by most international agencies appears to be driven by a single paradigm: liberal internationalism. According to Roland Paris, ‘The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-orientated economy.’ While established liberal democracies may be less prone to violent domestic conflict, the transformation of illiberal and conflict-prone states into such democracies is perilous. In such instances, then, the liberal internationalist approach to peacebuilding may be said to be flawed. It is for this reason that Paris advocates a strategy that he terms ‘institutionalization before liberalization’, which would prioritize embedding institutions and regulations rather than seeking early elections as a sign of democracy, as the international community so often does. (Herman et al. 2011, 14)

Western nations and various organizations that promote democracy in post–conflict societies need to bear in mind that democracy is more than mere rituals of voting and elections. It is the plurality of opinions, freedom of expression, multi–party political system, political competition, free and universal multi–party elections, fundamental and human rights, rule of law and accountability of the rulers which constitute democracy. This is more than mere majority rule, because even a majority can be a dictator over the ideational, ideological, racial, ethnic, lingual and religious minority. (Gebrewold 2008, 149) Factors that exacerbate poverty and inequality and challenge the establishment and consolidation of democracy in post–conflict societies include: centralized governments, personalized powers, ethnicized politics and lack of transparency and accountability. This lack of accountability consists of lack of answerability (public officials informing and explaining to the public what they are doing) and enforcement (accounting agencies imposing sanctions against the violators). (Gebrewold 2008, 158)

Peacebuilding missions are increasingly multi-dimensional, involving extensive programming in capacity–building for collapsed state structures generally, and specific support to the executive, administrative apparatus, judiciary, and parliament in states emerging from conflict. (Herman et al. 2011, 14) This trend towards multi-dimensional peacekeeping reflects the recognition by the international community that the maintenance of peace and security in the aftermath of conflict requires more than just an intervening neutral military force. Holistic responses are required to help address the causes of the conflict, to support law and order in the immediate post–conflict setting, and to guard against backsliding to conflict and war. The previous approach, of inserting military peacekeepers on the ground to maintain stability while rushing elections and then rapidly withdrawing the operation, has been shown to be flawed. Withdrawing and downsizing international efforts too early leads to the breakdown of law and order as Rwanda experience during the 1994 genocide shows. Beyond military peacekeeping and elections, assistance now often includes the provision of political ‘good offices’: support for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegartion of former combatants: strengthening rule of law and governance institutions: work with state and non–state actors to strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights: as well as evolving efforts to support security sector reform. (Pulver 2011, 67)

In a similar vein, Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank offered important new insights into the difficulties faced by peacekeepers and other international agencies active in areas of conflict. From this perspective, most civil wars are driven by ideology or grievance, but by greed and predation (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 178). For example, rebel groups in some African countries had effectively set up parallel economies, trading in precious resources such as hardwoods, diamonds, drugs, and so on (178). Other scholars are convinced that political
and economic inequalities following group lines generate grievances that can motivate civil war from horizontal inequality to civil war via grievances. This is a refutation of the claim by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) that civil wars are generated not by the complex intractability of government exclusion and discrimination and resulting group grievance but by more straightforward rebel greed and a contestation over economic resources. It also conflicts with the argument of Fearon and Laitin (2003) that civil wars are caused not by grievances but by opportunities that favour insurgencies. If Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin are correct, and what counts is not grievance but the relative capabilities of rebels versus the state, the strategies of peace through strength, repression and deterrence would appear to be optimal strategies. In the event, both Collier (2008) and Fearon and Laitin (2011) have rowed back from their earlier positions. Cederman et al. the best way to the cycle of violence driven by political exclusion and economic inequality is to involve groups that have been marginalized by giving them a real stake in their country’s future. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 122)

As third parties international organizations and individuals are often essential in contributing to issue transformations, they typically help the conflicting parties by putting them in contact with one another, gaining their trust and confidence, setting agendas, clarifying issues and formulating agreements. They can facilitate meetings by arranging venues, reducing tensions, exploring the interests of the parties and sometimes guiding the parties to unrealized possibilities. (Ramsbotham 213) This is exactly what happens with different organizations and individuals who have interceded for 4.3 grand tragedy. These individuals and organizations have approached the United States and South Korean government so that they not only acknowledge wrongdoings that these governments did to the people of Jeju in 1940s and 1950s but also that they compensate the victims. International mediation has become an increasingly crowded field, with international organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations all involved. (214) International organizations’ efforts are often very impressive. (216) Similarly, regional organizations are playing an increasing role in peacebuilding especially in forms of mediation and are particularly important in managing conflicts in their own region. (217)

Peacebuilders in particular and international organizations in general should know that neoliberal approaches have increased tension over the development of a liberal state in potentially non-liberal settings, particularly because they may only promote social justice in a more indirect way (if at all) than, say, more state-directed approaches to economic management. Indeed, it could be argued that the liberal peacebuilding project has focused upon institutions that rebuild or support hierarchical class systems supporting economic elites. This is especially problematic if such populations value welfare and aspire to equality in varying proportion to political and legal rights, and expect the state to provide redistributive safety nets. In Africa this is problematic because of the scale of the poverty and development challenges and the ways in which the state has often developed in a predatory fashion both prior to and during conflict. Leaders often cannot or will not provide the sorts of resources that citizens require, and are not accountable to the latter. In addition, predatory elites benefit from this state, as it allows them space to manipulate society, the economy, and political processes in their favour. The main remedies for this failing, lie in a better understanding of the needs of local populations, and their cultural, material, and political agendas. Peacebuilders should be much more conscious and cautious about the ideological settlements they implicitly support and how they engage and respond to localized needs and rights. (Richmond 2011, 54)

External attempts to export replicas of Western liberal democratic states, however, can in fact repress popular accountability of government and thus the states’ legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. By interlinking peacebuilding strategies with the wider project of state-building, Western intervention can have the adverse effect of undermining the sustainability of peace. In contrast to this narrow view of peace-building, NGOs have often viewed the process of peace-building in a broader sense which includes long-term transformative efforts, as well as peacemaking and peacekeeping. (Karbo 2008, 116)

The World Bank has emerged as a leading player in post-conflict peacebuilding. It has administered a post-conflict fund since 1997. Recognizing that a country coming out of civil war has a 50 per cent relapsing into conflict in the first five years of peace the World Bank devotes a significant proportion of its total funding to projects that address the effects of war. Its support for peacebuilding in fragile states and states in conflict is managed by its Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries group. (Ramsbotham 2016, 268) To introduce reform, liberal peacebuilding relies on conditionality and other forms of intervention. This creates a quasi-colonial relationship, and great tensions between international peacebuilders and the recipients of peacebuilding on the ground. This favours elites rather than the populations of such states. Yet the latter are the ones who are most at risk and most in need of a rule of law. (Richmond 2011, 50)

International organizations will continue to bear in
mind that the peace-building terrain in post-conflict societies is characterized by a significant number of challenges. Sadly, a sizeable number of armed conflicts relapse to war, resulting in renewed violence and ‘new’ wars, as proven by greater violence in Rwanda in 1994 after the failure of peace processes. Most peacemaking agreements do not last, and a lot of countries have demonstrated a relapse into violence. Although the number of violent conflicts has decreased since the beginning of the new millennium, there is strong evidence of recidivism in many post-conflict countries, as witnessed in Sudan, Uganda and Liberia. Collier et al. (2005) found empirical data that suggest that there is almost a 44 per cent risk of a country reaching the end of a conflict returning to conflict within five years. One reason for this is that the same factors that caused the initial war are usually still present. If a country has a fairly low average income, rural areas that are well endowed with natural resources, is surrounded by a hostile neighbour and has a large active diaspora, after the war it is likely that these characteristics will persist. Critics of Collier’s view assert that violent armed conflict is fraught with complex dynamics and processes, including the idea of interventions that are made by a plethora of international actors who have no interest in seeing countries relapse into violence. (Karbo 2008, 125).

One of the challenges with peace-building in post-conflict societies is that external players often attempt to engage in peace-building activities without seeking sustainable solutions at the grassroots level. Very often, peace-building is managed by international NGOs and diplomats, who have no intimate acquaintance with the local environment. Peace-building programmes are designed by northern NGOs with specific strategies for implementation. This approach has problems in the sense that designers and implementers are not accountable to members of communities where such programmes are implemented. Funds are disbursed to implementing partners of the northern NGOs which, in equal measure, are not accountable to local communities. Communities have no ownership of peace-building processes designed in the North, minimizing the possibilities of anyone having to account to members of local communities. The persistence of protracted internal conflict, increased cases of countries relapsing into war as well as the failure of major peace agreements in Africa are indications of the tricky ground on which peace-building stands. This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that the African state is usually fractured, failing or failed. Most failed or failing states in Africa experience severe economic decline, disintegration, social unrest and loss of state legitimacy, massive human and capital flight, absence of rule of law, poor governance structures and decline in public services. The state is increasingly divided along various cleavages, including ethnic, regional, linguistic and political divides. This is compounded by government corruption, which is usually very high in post-conflict countries. (Karbo 2008, 126–7)

Externally driven international efforts to resolve conflict in Africa are often faced with the limitation that the local parties are sometimes unwilling, or unable, to relate to such initiatives. Official high-level diplomacy tends to focus on promoting dialogue between the leaders of warring parties based on the assumption that these are the legitimate representatives of the people. This may be an erroneous assumption. Ultimately peace processes must also include local populations in order to be effectively grounded in their realities and so able to address their grievances. Indigenous and endogenous approaches to peace and conflict resolution in Africa provide us with insights into how more inclusive and community-based processes can be utilized. As the Gacaca case below proves, indigenous and endogenous peace processes are endowed with valuable insights that can inform the rebuilding of social trust and restoration of the conditions for communal coexistence. (Murithi 2008, 16) Genuine peacebuilding means an abandonment of uniform and bureaucratically imposed structures, a far greater sensitivity and nuanced understanding of local conditions, and a readiness to encompass a variety of voices, often conflicting, that must participate if there is to be inclusive collective reasoning about the peacebuilding project. (Ramsbotam et al. 2016, 266–7) Peacebuilding needs to go beyond northern epistemologies of peace (273).

Recent research has suggested that it may be worthwhile to think in terms of a ‘hybrid approach’ that might take best practices from indigenous and so-called ‘modern’ or official approaches to peace and conflict resolution. A hybrid approach would rely upon a combination of official and indigenous values, principles and norms. Such an approach would encourage parallel forums and interactive problem-solving workshops, utilizing indigenous and official approaches, to bring together key opinion leaders and civil society at the regional, national or local levels. Ultimately, a hybrid approach would strive to facilitate national peace talks, which can be sequenced to complement an official mediation process and can also bring community leaders and civil society into the process. (Murithi 2008, 29) International organizations need to move away from the paternalistic, technocratic one–size–fits all approach to peacebuilding. Shifting to a more bottom up society building approach, there is need to engage creatively and dynamically with local dynamics.
One of the significant peacebuilding and peacemaking traditions in Africa involving elders can be drawn from the Banyarwanda community in Rwanda. It is popularly known as Gacaca. This intricate tradition, which started at community level but soon attained national importance in Rwanda, derived its name from a grass known as Urucaca, which grows in homesteads in the country. The conflict management approach places emphasis on three things: dialogue, reconciliation and reparation. The process involves elders gathering in front of the Urucaca in the homestead to resolve conflicts. Proceedings in a Gacaca court involve plaintiffs, defendants and witnesses. Each party is asked to present his/her case. The defendants do not have lawyers but any member of the community can participate and intervene in the proceedings, either against or in favour of the defendant. As usual there is cross-examination of the parties, and the elders, rather than pass judgment per se, try to reconstruct the broken relationship. So productive is this African approach to conflict management that it was incorporated in the official legal system in Rwanda. In 2001, about 260,000 men of integrity, honesty and good conduct (inyangamugayo) were selected from local communities to establish more than ten thousand Gacaca tribunals in different parts of Rwanda to find out the truth about the 1994 genocide in the country. (Albert 2008, 41) It is noteworthy that had these cases of genocide been judged by usual courts let alone the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) they would have taken many years to judge those who committed genocide. Despite its shortcomings, we should recommend what Gacaca achieved especially in terms of reconciling the victims of genocide and perpetrators. At the same time, we should avoid the tendency to over-romanticize indigenous approaches to peacemaking and also discuss some of the limitations inherent in these processes. Paradoxically, the duration of some indigenous peacemaking can be viewed as a weakness, because, depending on the willingness of parties to achieve consensus, such processes can become indefinite. While indigenous processes are inclusive and consensual, for a variety of reasons, often they do not necessarily proceed on the basis of socio-political expediency. (Murithi 2008, 28) Just as top-down institutionally driven peacebuilding can, and frequently does, marginalize local interests and disempowered, so too local cultures and communities are sites of power asymmetry, patriarchy and privilege. (Ramsbotham 2016, 277) Still on the case of Rwanda, international donors have been very important government partners in the reconstruction of Rwanda, notably in the areas of justice, rule of law, and peacebuilding. A recent report on international assistance to post-genocide Rwanda singles out ‘the reconstruction of institutions concerned with justice and the establishment of the rule of law’ as having ‘unquestionably led to significant and tangible results’ in contrast with the promotion of civil and political rights, or electoral and media assistance. (Brown 2011, 181) Though they recognize that Rwanda is not the democracy that the government claims it is, international donors consider governance to be by and large good enough and moving in the right direction especially when compared to its neighbours Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Brown argues that donors have other priorities and prefer to focus on less politically charged, more ‘technocratic’ issues. They forget that supporting the justice sector does not ipso facto promote justice, especially when the judicial and quasi-judicial institutions lack independence and impartiality. By financing and legitimizing the government and enhancing the ruling party’s monopoly of power, donors are not promoting democratization, peaceful coexistence, and the rule of law. Rather, they are collectively contributing to the construction of new institutions of social control and to conditions that could plausibly lead to renewed conflict. (Brown 2011, 195) Brown goes on to argue that the Rwandan government’s close control over transitional justice mechanisms at all levels in many ways actually impedes the establishment of the rule of law and the promotion of sustainable peace. International donors, by providing financial and other forms of assistance and generally turning a blind eye to the highly problematic politicization of the justice sector, are complicit to the institutionalization of authoritarian rule and help undermine the same long-term goals that they profess to support. (179) As a matter of fact, as a post-conflict society Rwanda is always in need of making sure there are no structural injustices that are done against the victims of the genocide. Peacebuilding activities should always be focused on bringing about positive peace.

Jeju Island is a case that shows how the urgency of positive peace for its citizens, especially those victims of the 4.3 grand tragedy. Peace is a complex notion that is associated with different meanings and that is understood in various ways across nations, disciplines and cultures. In places where they have experienced wars and conflict like in my native Rwanda and other African nations, and in Jeju Island for that matter many people associate peace with the absence of direct violence, conflict and war. Once guns are silent and people are no longer murdered, people are quick to proclaim the advent of peace. As the above discussion...
has shown, peace is not just about the absence of direct violence and the absence of conflict. That is simply negative peace. There is also positive peace. Leaders should not be blinded by the absence of war (negative peace) which can at times make us forget the urgent need of positive peace. During a peace conference in August in 2017 in Jeju Island, I said that as someone who witnessed the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda I can easily sympathize with victims of Jeju 4.3 Grand Tragedy. As someone who has lived in Rwandan community in the aftermath of the genocide and its consequences I can easily sympathize with Jeju community. While in Jeju I realized that Jeju island is not only a place to learn and teach peace to other people from all over the world: it is not just a source of inspiration for those who seek peace but the aftermath of 4.3 entails that Jeju has been on a journey to peacemaking and peacebuilding. Like Rwanda or any place that experienced hostilities, there has to be peacebuilding that encompasses the social, political, legal, economic, military domains. This is done at societal or national level as well as individual levels. Jeju Island can only be a true inspiration of world peace if it embarks on a journey of searching for positive peace and amending historic injustices. As Yomamoto, Petit and Lee 2014 say “those concerned about healing the wounds of historic injustice need [...] to help shape, implement and assess social healing, or reconciliation, initiatives”. (7)

The end of 4.3 atrocities in 1954 and 1994 genocide marked the end of direct violence and hence the establishment of negative peace. But the journey towards positive started or was in the horizon. Unfortunately, as history shows, this journey towards positive peace for 4.3 has been long and for some a nightmare. Ko, Kim and McLeod 2014 maintain that “Many survivors and families have carried a hidden burden of anger, despair, guilt and pain since the 1950’s. This suffering will remain until such a time when victims and actors in the Tragedy have had a forum to discuss the events, recognize the tragedy as the massacre it was by all parties involved, receive professional counseling and support, and even pursue compensation. A healing process to the tragedy will ensure a light remains lit for the victims in history”. (15) It took so many years for both the USA and the government of South Korea to formally recognize their responsibility and to bring about reparation. Positive peace, it seems, is not just a long journey but a day to day journey that never ends. How can people therefore work towards positive peace for the Jeju 4.3 grand tragedy victims? Ko et al. 2016 say that “The tragedy has left behind enduring suffering for the victims and their families that persists to this day.” (168) There can be no true positive peace if reparations and healing is not fully and properly done to the victims of 4.3. By not fully attending to the victims of 4.3 a kind of indirect violence is committed: structural injustices are not amended. Structural violence could be expressed in the existence of various forms of political repression and economic exploitation (Galtung 1996, 2). Bringing about positive peace entails working to transform one’s attitude and contradiction. The experience of Rwanda and Jeju Island shows that positive peace is a true, lasting, and sustainable peace built on justice for all peoples. Efforts to achieve positive peace emphasize: establishing peace through world order by supporting international law, compliance with multilateral treaties, use of international courts, and nonviolent resolution of disputes, participation in international organizations, trade, and communication, establishing social equality and justice, economic equity, ecological balance: protecting citizens from attack, and meeting basic human needs, establishing a civil peace that provides the constitutional and legal means necessary to settle differences nonviolently, eliminating indirect violence, that shortens the life span of people, sustains unequal life chances, or reduces quality of life for any citizen. The concept of positive peace involves the elimination of the root causes of war, violence, and injustice and the conscious attempt to build a society that reflects these commitments. Positive peace assumes an interconnectedness of all life” (Herath 2012, 104). All the parties responsible for 4.3 should work hand in hand with the victims so as to bring about positive peace for a better society and sustainable economic development. To what extent is it possible to eliminate conflict and bring about negative peace and positive peace?

Realist critiques of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding

‘Conflict management theorists see violent conflict as an ineradicable consequence of differences of values and interests within and between communities. … Resolving such conflicts is viewed as unrealistic: the best that can be done is to manage and contain them, and occasionally to reach a historic compromise in which violence may be laid aside and normal politics resumed.’ (Omeje 2008, 69) Conflict resolution, in particular the traditional or mainstream paradigm, comes with a basic assumption about the theory and causality of conflicts. It is an assumption rooted in the classical realist and behaviouralist (especially behavioural psychology) notion that human behaviour – and by corollary the behaviour of human organizations, institutions and states – is chiefly motivated by self-interest. Incompatible interests among actors inevitably result in conflicts, and where restraints are not exercised – which, depending on the issues at stake, underlying social context and disposition of actors is
often the case – in the pursuit of driving interests, the conflicts could turn nastily violent. For realists, the behavioural regression to violent conflict is aggravated by asymmetries in the equation of power, which provides actors with the ultimate opportunity to explore coercive means in the pursuit of their interests. From this realist standpoint, violent conflicts are therefore viewed as rational choices of rational actors in a world of limited resources and competitive interests. (Omeje 2008, 68–9) Despite the widespread social costs, conflicts do have beneficiaries, for whom they can represent a source of livelihood and economic advancement. Warlords, militias, certain sections of governing elites, and rebel groups may profit from opportunities to exploit land, labour or resources, and outside arms manufacturers, traders and corporations sometimes. (154) Often than not elite and identity groups resist efforts by liberal peacebuilders to reorganize the state around institutional arrangements that reduce or eliminate their benefits/interests. (Richmond 2011, 50)

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Similarly, many realists, especially in recent decades, have given near-exclusive emphasis to anarchy, the absence of hierarchical political rule. Anarchy assures the centrality of the struggle for power even in the absence of aggressivity or similar factors. Ultimately, conflict and war are rooted in human pride, lust, and the quest for glory would cause the war of all against all to continue indefinitely. (Burchill et al. 2009, 32) David Chandler (2004, 2006) – a realist –interprets contemporary world politics as no more than a limited society of states with a common interest in preserving collective order, but not enough to underpin universal interventionary principles. Sovereignty preserves plural values and is best left to do just that. The alternative, by breaching non-interventionary norms, distorts local development and invariably leads to great power abuse. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 191–2) Philip Cunliffe dismisses UN peacekeeping as the highest form of liberal imperialism and regards peacekeepers from the global south as modern–day askaris (2013: 217). Ramsbotham et al. 2016 do not think that abandonment of the precarious sixty–year–old UN peacekeeping experiment would lead to a more equal or safer world (193).

Critical theory of conflict resolution articulates an alternative view that challenges the assumptions of realists and behaviourists about the inevitability and irresolvability of violent conflicts. Contending that the realists’ conflict management agenda privileges status–quo–oriented asymmetries in power distribution and correlated interests, critical theorists argue that conflict resolution is not only possible in certain conflicts, but also necessary and desirable for change, emancipation and transformation. The discourse of ‘emancipatory transformation’ in fact, leads to the crucial distinction that many critical theorists make between conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Conflict resolution aims to address causes of conflict and seeks to build new and lasting relationships between hostile parties by helping them to explore, analyze, question and reframe their positions and interests: it moves conflicting parties from the destructive patterns of zero-sum conflict to positive-sum (win–win) constructive outcomes (Miall 2004: 3–4). This is exactly what peacebuilding and peacemaking are all about. The USA and South Korean government need to question their positions and responsibility in the 4.3 tragedy and act accordingly. Conflict transformation, on the other hand, is a process of engaging with and transforming the wider social, economic and political structures underlying a conflict, including transformation of the relationships, interests, discourse and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. While conflict resolution is mostly suitable for solving open conflicts, conflict transformation is appropriate for addressing both open and latent/surface conflicts. Critical theorists emphasize the
role of a skilled and powerful third party as crucial for helping parties achieve constructively desirable outcomes in conflict resolution/ transformation. (Omeje 2008, 68–9) Contra realists, liberals want to believe that peace is the normal state of affairs. The laws of nature dictated harmony and cooperation between peoples. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human nature. Liberals have a belief in progress and the perfectibility of the human condition. (Burchil et al. 2009, 60)

Neo–realists have two responses to the liberal claim that economic interdependency is pacifying international relations. First, they argue that in any struggle between competing disciplines, the anarchic environment and the insecurity it engenders will always take priority over the quest for economic prosperity. Economic interdependency will never take precedence over strategic security because states must be primarily concerned with their survival. Their capacity to explore avenues of economic cooperation will therefore be limited by how secure they feel, and the extent to which they are required to engage in military competition with others. Secondly, the idea of economic interdependence implies a misleading degree of equality and shared vulnerability to economic forces in the global economy. Interdependence does not eliminate hegemony and dependency in inter–state relations because power is very unevenly distributed throughout the world’s trade and financial markets. Dominant players such as the United States have usually framed the rules under which interdependency has flourished. Conflict and cooperation is therefore unlikely to disappear, though it may be channelled into more peaceful forms. (68)

Realists need to know that conflict resolution is broader than conflict termination, and the relationship between conflict resolution and the ending of violent conflict is not necessarily direct. The root causes may persist without either war or a peace settlement doing anything to address them. More often than not, war generates additional conflicts, which add to and confuse the original issues. It is quite possible that efforts to resolve a conflict may not end a war, and efforts to end a war may not resolve the underlying conflict. (Ramsbotham et al. 2016, 199)

The state is the centerpiece of realist work. Few persons would disagree as to the importance of the state in international affairs. The criticism, however, is that realists are so obsessed with the state that they ignore other actors and other issues not directly related to the maintenance of state security. Other non–state actors—multinational corporations, banks, terrorists, and international organizations—are either excluded, downplayed, or trivialized in the realist perspective. Furthermore, given the national security prism through which realists view the world, other concerns such as the socioeconomic gap between rich and poor societies, international pollution, and the implications of globalization rarely make the realist agenda. (Vioitti and Kaupi 2012, 76) Given the realist view of the international system, the role of the state, and balance–of–power politics, critics suggest that very little possibility is left for the fundamental and peaceful transformation of international politics. Realists, claim the critics, at best offer analysis aimed at understanding how international stability is achieved, but nothing approaching true peace. Realist stability reflects a world bristling with weapons, forever on the verge of violent conflict and war. Alternative world futures—scenarios representing a real alternative to the dismal Hobbesian world—are rarely discussed or taken seriously. (78)

Conclusion

This article has distinguished peacebuilding and peacekeeping from peacemaking (Figure 3). We have shown that peace–keeping refers to the interposition of international armed forces to separate the armed forces of belligerents, often now associated with civil tasks such as monitoring and policing and supporting humanitarian intervention. Peace–making is used in the sense of moving towards settlement of armed conflict, where conflict parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily. Peace–building underpins the work of peace–making and peace–keeping by addressing structural issues and the long–term relationships between conflictants. The three approaches are useful to international organizations, individuals and nations that work on conflict resolution in post–conflict societies like Rwanda and Jeju Island. We have suggested that it would be more useful if these approaches which often than not use Northern epistemologies of peace incorporated local approaches of conflict resolution and embraced a bottom–up perspective to benefit the grassroots people who are in a great need of peace. Gacaca is a local effort that Rwandans have used to build peace in their country. Similarly, Bulteok in Jeju Island is another concept of peacebuilding that needs to be taken into consideration to build a peaceful society. The realists challenge Gacaca and Bulteok efforts for they think that conflict cannot be resolved for it is part and parcel of human nature and it is the very essence of power relations that characterize nations and societies in their power games that lead to a security dilemma in international relations. Realists want us to believe that we live in a “Hobbesian” state of nature in which life is nasty, poor, short and brutish. However, there is no continent that suffered like Europe during World War I and II and before and
yet it has enjoyed liberal peace. After devastating conflicts that took lives of its people, Rwanda and Jeju Island are enjoying negative peace. But there is need to recognize that positive peace is as important as negative peace and hence a need for stakeholders to continue putting efforts in ending all forms of structural injustices. If well applied, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes could help post–conflict societies achieve lasting peace.

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