

Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding on Jeju Island

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Abstract

Using Johan Galtung's positive peace/negative peace dichotomy as criteria, this paper will evaluate three approaches to conflict resolution: peacekeeping (interposition of international forces to separate armed belligerents), peacemaking (third-party mediations and negotiated settlements), and peacebuilding (addressing underlying structural issues and long-term relationships between conflict parties), to describe the Jeju Peace Island initiative as a necessary approach to resolving conflict and creating positive peace on the Korean peninsula. Galtung conceptualized the problem of war and peace through a "conflict triangle" with attitude, behavior, and contradiction as its vertices. Galtung argued that all three components would always be present together in a full conflict. As parties disagree over contradictory interests, they develop hostile attitudes which feed conflict behavior. In this dynamic process conflict grows, intensifies, deepens and spreads. This all complicates the task of addressing the original core conflict. Peacebuilding initiatives on Jeju island to resolve the Korean conflict and build positive peace come out of that island's history of violence. Of particular importance is the memory of the tragic April 3rd 1948 uprising on Jeju island, also known as the 4·3 (or "sasam") incident, that happened during the Korean War when tens of thousands of islanders, accused of being communists, were massacred by South Korean forces with American assistance. As a result of a series of initiatives to build peace, the South Korean government declared Jeju an "Island of World Peace" on Jan. 27, 2005, and since then several peacebuilding initiatives have been successfully implemented, including the annual Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, the permanent Jeju International Peace Center, and efforts to institutionalize peace studies at Jeju national university.


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This paper takes its title from an old essay by one of the most prolific thinkers in peace studies, Johan Galtung, whose h-index of 72 gives him an incontestable name in the field. "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding" (1976) is a work still cited four decades after its original publication. It is a difficult text to read, not linear in its writing, logical, but often convoluted in language, requiring readers to already be in possession of most of his technical terminology, and understanding all of his premises. Galtung's basic idea, if one could speak of his text with such simplistic assertions, was that conventional approaches to ending violent conflict through "peacekeeping" (interposition of international forces to separate armed belligerents) were not sufficient to create lasting peace, because they only acted on the immediate effects of violent conflict, but did not resolve the deeper causes of war. He also found insufficient the by-then fashionable "peacemaking" (third-party mediations and negotiated settlements) which acted on the conflict attitudes beneath the violent behavior of the parties, but did not change structural sources underlying the dispute. Violent conflicts may be based on violent attitudes, but those attitudes are in turn based on real world contradictions. "Conflict should not be confused with manifestations of conflict in terms of attitude and/or behavior, usually of a negative, destructive, kind." (291) Galtung proposed adding a third option – "peacebuilding" – to address these underlying structural issues and long-term relationships between the conflict parties.

To understand how this would work and, more importantly, its challenge to the status quo, one needs to know his philosophy of peace. In his previous writings he had distinguished between "negative peace" (ending violent conflict) and "positive peace" (ending structural sources of conflict and attitudes which lead to the use of violence). He drew this distinction in an editorial written for the founding edition of the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. His negative peace/positive peace dichotomy is probably Galtung's most famous and most cited contribution to the field. While today the distinction is something of a bromide, before then Western conflict resolution theory had been dominated, like conflict itself, by US scholars, whose approach over-emphasized military solutions. The Cold War with the Soviet Union was approached by US foreign policy establishment through the lens of nuclear deterrence, and proxy wars in the allied states through the lens of Security Council resolutions sending UN peacekeeping forces that, in Galtung's philosophy, might bring "negative peace," but would

never create "positive peace."

Galtung conceptualized the problem of war and peace through a "conflict triangle" with attitude (A), behavior (B), and contradiction (C) as its vertices. (Figure 1) The contradiction referred to the underlying conflict situation, which could be a dispute over territory or religion or resources or whatever; it was defined by the parties and reflected their clash of interests. Attitudes included perceptions and misperceptions by the parties of each other, and in conflict these usually took the form of demeaning stereotypes of the "other," emotions of fear, anger, bitterness and hatred, as well as beliefs, and frustrated desires. Behavior, the third component, could be cooperation or coercion, conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behavior in particular, like war, was always characterized by threats, coercion, and destructive attacks. Galtung argued that all three components would always be present together in a full conflict. As parties disagree over their contradictory interests, they develop hostile attitudes and conflict behavior. In this dynamic process conflict grows, intensifies, deepens and spreads. This all complicates the task of addressing the original core conflict.



< Figure 1. Galtung's Models of Conflict and Peace >

Resolving any conflict, therefore, necessarily involved a set of dynamic changes in order to de-escalate the conflict behavior, to change the attitudes, and to transform the relationships or clashing interests at the core of the conflict structure. These correspond what Galtung was calling, in his essay on three approaches to peace, peacekeeping (changing violent behavior), peacemaking (changing conflict attitudes), and peacebuilding (addressing the structural sources of the conflict). I will now consider each one, briefly, and in that order.

There are some 18 active UN "peacekeeping" missions in the world today. United Nations Peacekeeping forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) created

in 1964, long before Galtung even wrote his essay, has still not resolved the underlying dispute. The longevity of such perennial UN peacekeeping operations is terrifying testimony to their inefficacy: UNTSO in the Middle East (1948–), UNMOGIP in India & Pakistan (1949–), UNDOF in Syria (1974–), UNIFIL in Lebanon (1978–), UNMIK in Kosovo (1999–), UNAMA in Afghanistan (2002–). The growing number of subsequent UN peacekeeping missions is equally terrifying testimony to the lack of ideas or resourcefulness by the international community to find better solutions: UNMIL in Liberia (2003), MINUSTAH in Haiti (2004), UNOCI in Ivory Coast (2004), UNAMID in Darfour (2007), MONUSCO in Congo (2010), UNISFA and UNMISS in South Sudan (2011), MINUSMA in Mali (2013). (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/)

While the older missions suffered from the constraints of the so-called “holy trinity” requiring peacekeeping forces to first acquire the consent of the conflict parties, be impartial, and not use force; a new UN “capstone doctrine” allows peacekeepers to use force to protect themselves and their mandate, upholding cosmopolitan norms like UN Charter principles or even the “responsibility to protect.” Yet even with this expanded concept of collective security to include human security, and the inclusion of development workers and aid relief to traditional military peacekeeping operations, intervention to limit or contain the intensity, geographical spread, or duration of a war – the very definition of peacekeeping – can never resolve the underlying issues, attitudes, and structures that bring about war in the first place. Peacekeeping is necessary, but not sufficient.

Moreover, as the research of such scholars as the World Bank’s Paul Collier have showed, peacekeeping missions are affected by the context of a “war zone” in which civilians and humanitarian staff are targeted by warlords, who use terror as a means of social control, and create dirty war strategies including state – sponsored terror, scorched earth tactics, and parallel economies which profit the entrepreneurs of violence. Most of all in the context of new wars – protracted social conflicts – peacekeepers find themselves permanently stationed in conflicts which have no short – term prospect of resolution. (Collier 2000)

Since conflict resolution is broader than the termination of hostilities, and ending a violent conflict does not necessarily resolve the underlying issues that were its root causes, emphasis on mediation and negotiations swept across the field of conflict resolution. “Peacemaking” involved changing attitudes by transformation. There are many kinds

of conflict transformers (which transform attitudes), including contextual transformers (like the end of the Cold War bringing to an end to its proxy wars), structural transformers (like recognition of a national secessionist movement), actor transformers (like Gorbachev’s glasnost), issue transformers (like the rise of the Islamic terrorism), as well as personal transformations (like guerilla leaders becoming national politicians). Any of these transformers of attitudes must involve real changes in parties’ interests, goals or self-definitions to work. The end of the Cold War, for example, ended ideological justifications for intervention and a reduction in armed support for rebels, which contributed to ending violent conflicts in Latin America. Since then the proportion of conflicts ending in peace agreements has significantly increased, and the proportion of civil wars ending in negotiation has been estimated to be around one quarter, or twenty-five percent. Between 1964 and 1989, of 141 conflicts included in one study, around nine percent ended in some kind of peace agreement. Rather than sending in blue helmeted peacekeepers, the peacemaking approach suggests, an alternative is to send more mediators. But most of the time peace agreements are instable, and do not produce real or lasting peace. Guatemala experienced sixteen peace agreements between 1990 and 1996. The change in conflict attitudes, like the change in behavior, without solving the core contradictions, is insufficient for creating positive peace.

There are many reasons for the failure of negotiated settlements to build on a change in conflict attitudes. First of all conflicts must be “ripe” for accepting a negotiated settlement. This “ripeness” idea was argued by the political scientist I. William Zartman (1985) as why so many protracted social conflicts on the African continent, after arriving at a peace agreement, returned to hostilities. Parties who had been persuaded by peacemakers to cease hostilities, but who were not yet ready, would require a ripening process through creation of a hurting stalemate, that is, a prolongation of the conflict that increases its costs. Another problem is when direct negotiation between the parties is not forthcoming, in which case a third-party mediator is used. Such mediated crises are twice as likely to end with a peace agreement. Nevertheless the largest role in peacemaking is still played by international organizations and states, often perceived as allies of one of the conflict parties. While UN legitimacy does contribute to its special role in setting out principles for settlement, arranging ceasefires, organizing peacekeeping, facilitating elections, and monitoring demilitarization, the Security Council is

the handmaiden of powerful states. It is hard to get realpolitik out of the process. Most of all there is a strategic dilemma for warlords. Given a choice between a ceasefire and continuing the violence, many might prefer peace, but will refuse to accept a ceasefire because the other side holds out, and so the rational strategy in this security dilemma is to continue to fight. Finally there are “spoilers” to the settlement who attempt to wreck it. (Stedman 1997)

Galtung called peacekeeping a “dissociative approach” because it attempted to keep the conflict parties separated. This of course prevents them getting them together for settlement. He called peacemaking “conflict resolution” because they sought to either eliminate the incompatibility, or get the parties to pursue other goals, but remained fundamentally actor-oriented. “The major objection to the peacemaking approach is that it often grows out of an unrealistic conception of conflict resolution,” explains Galtung, ‘as something that rests in the minds of the conflicting parties, of the actors.’ (1976: 295) For that reason we have to turn to deeper lying factors in the relations between the parties in order to arrive at some ideas about how a self-supporting conflict resolution can be found. And this is what he referred to as “peacebuilding.”

He asks his readers, having suggested the importance of the structural causes of conflict, “What structure would decrease the likelihood of violence, what is the structure of peace?” (297) In putting the question this way the implicit hypothesis is that peace has a structure different from peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking. “More particularly, structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.” (298)

Although his was a short essay, and by no means a historical analysis of actual conflicts, he does attempt to outline what he considers to be structures of peace. They are enumerated with brief examples of the success of the Nordic countries and of the European Community: (1) equity, meaning that no party shall be exploited, meaning horizontal interactions, and symmetrical patterns; (2) entropy, meaning that not only the government elite participate, but relations spread out to the people, including civil society in the process; (3) symbiosis, meaning a high level of interdependence, exchange within the system is a substantial proportion of the production of its members; (4) broad scope, meaning a deepening of the system, with many types of exchange, not just economic; (5) large domain, meaning an extension of the system, with more than two parties; and finally (6) superstructure, meaning some kind of

annual conference or organizational framework for the system, like a permanent secretariat or rotating capitals. (298–299)

Now, to apply Galtung’s ideas to the conflicts of the Korean peninsula, and more specifically to show how recent initiatives on the autonomous province of Jeju island are contributing to the peacebuilding process, I would like to draw your attention to Galtung’s more recent writings about Korea contained in a collection of one hundred case studies published in 2008. In it he distinguishes between two conflicts. The first is the conflict between North and South Korea (chapter 18). The second is conflict with the United States over North Korea’s development of the nuclear bomb (chapter 93). Although these two conflicts are related, more than superficially, they are different conflicts, over different things, and require different approaches. Resolution of the second conflict requires the US to treat North Korea as an equal. There is little Jeju island can do about that. But for the first conflict Galtung’s suggestions are to talk less about collapse of the two countries and more about the need for some social and political change in both, to talk less about unification of the two countries and more about some concrete cooperation between them, to talk less about the hard military political issues and more about soft economic, social, and cultural cooperation. The structure of peace that he suggests involves things like all-Korean cooperation in alternative energy production, ecological agriculture, forestation, fish farming, rail and road transport, and opening a peace university. Now, I am not suggesting that any of these ideas will happen. The idea here is simply to illustrate what the structure of peace might look like, to understand the kinds of things that peacebuilding involves.

In February 1988, South Korean President Rho Tae Woo announced his intention to normalize diplomatic relations with communist states to isolate North Korea. Thus, in September 1990, South Korea and the Soviet Union established formal diplomatic ties. In consideration of North Korea’s shocked reaction to this move and, the first summit between the two countries in April 1991 was held on Jeju, an international resort island, rather than Seoul, the capital and political center. The meeting of Rho and Mikhail Gorbachev was a milestone in the ending of the Cold War, and Jeju Islanders launched a campaign to have the island designated an “Island of Peace” for global and common prosperity. Jeju’s geographic location at the heart of Northeast Asia made it an ideal location for peace talks in the region. To realize the vision, prestigious diplomatic events were held. In April 1996 South Korean President Kim Young Sam and U.S. President Bill Clinton held a summit on Jeju.

This was followed in June of the same year by a meeting between President Kim and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro. There was even a banquet hall piano performance in 1995 for Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who had helped establish diplomatic relations between Korea and China in August 1992. As a result of these efforts to build peace, the Korean government declared Jeju an "Island of World Peace" on Jan. 27, 2005.

The declaration wasn't based solely on Jeju developing as a Mecca for summit diplomacy. Seoul also considered Jeju islanders' will for reconciliation and human rights in light of the tragic April 3rd Uprising, also known as the 4·3 ("Sasam") Incident, a tragedy that happened during the Korean War when tens of thousands of islanders were massacred by South Korean forces with American assistance. In 1948, a protest movement on Jeju organized against the appointment of Syngman Rhee as president of Korea by the US military. The violent crackdown on Jeju's supposed "communists" and "communist-sympathizers" by the South Korean army, allegedly backed by the US military, resulted in the death of somewhere around 30,000 Jeju civilians. Numerous villages were burned and civilians slaughtered, in a period that lasted the duration of the Korean War. Decades of government suppression followed, resulting in the emergence of a nationwide movement for democracy. Jeju's 'Sasam movement' was born in the 1980s for the purpose of achieving truth, reconciliation, and healing from these events. In 2008 the Jeju April 3rd Peace Park was established as a memorial to this peacemaking process. The "Island of World Peace" designation was also based on several folk traditions of self-reliance and pride, symbolized by Jeju island's so-called "three absences" (no beggars, no thieves, and no gates) that embody Jeju islander's cultural traditions for a peaceful community life.

One of the component parts of peacebuilding is peace education. As the development of the field of peace studies has demonstrated, techniques of conflict resolution go well beyond the military doctrines of ceasefires and the schools of strategic studies which tend to dominate the field. In order to create the preconditions for a lasting and genuine positive peace, the structures of peaceful coexistence and non-violent dispute resolution mechanisms must be taught. For as Immanuel Kant said in his famous essay on Perpetual Peace (1795): "The state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state (*status naturalis*); the natural state is one of war. A state of peace, therefore, must be established."

Jeju Island has been host to numerous heads of state, and its international profile as an "Island of World Peace" has risen ever since the first Jeju Peace Forum was held in 2001. In the final proclamation of that forum it was suggested that a separate peace institute be founded on the island, and two years later ground was broken for the Jeju International Peace Center. The Jeju Peace Forum has been held regularly on a biennial basis ever since, and the Jeju Peace Institute remains committed to furthering peace studies and promoting regional cooperation. Jeju Peace Institute is a South Korean think tank created in 2006 as a research institution devoted to the study and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula and to foster regional cooperation in East Asia. It is located on the southern coast of Jeju Island. The Jeju Peace Institute was founded with three goals: to promote the vision of Northeast Asia as a region of unity and cooperation, to raise Jeju's stature as an Island of World Peace, and to become a leading organization in peace research and programs throughout Asia and the world. Its mission of fostering understanding is not exclusive to international politics, but desires to help the people of Jeju strengthen their relationship with the mainland Koreans. Its purpose also promotes the use of economic and political diplomacy in achieving stable peace.

The Jeju Forum is a regional multilateral dialogue for promoting peace and prosperity in Asia. It serves as a platform for discussing visions on sustainable peace in the Asia region. Hosted by the government of Jeju's special self-governing province with the full support of the foreign affairs ministry in Seoul, the Forum was launched in 2001 as Jeju Peace Forum. Meetings had been held biennially before 2009 and when it became an annual event in 2011, and the Forum was renamed "Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity." The Forum is held in May each year, in Jeju with scores of sessions, including plenary sessions and various networking opportunities. The Forum mission is to build peace in East Asia by facilitating a multilateral dialogue on peace, diplomacy and security among related stakeholders.

The first forum in 2001 addressed the region's prospects for peace. The second in 2003, inaugurated by President Roh Moo-hyun, sought to involve private sector actors to extend the process. The third forum in 2005, with major support from the national government, addressed economic security through free trade agreements and launched an agenda for regional cooperation. The fourth forum sought to apply lessons from Europe. The fifth forum addressed key security issues like North Korea's nuclear program. The sixth forum in

2011 addressed China's rising power and Korean reunification. The seventh forum in 2012 focused on how regional security would be necessary for future prosperity. The eighth forum focused on tensions arising from North Korean nuclear proliferation. The ninth forum dealt with international cooperation and solutions to regional problems. The tenth forum in 2015 commemorated the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonialism, addressing how relations with Japan since then made progress toward peaceful cooperation. The eleventh forum in 2016 held 69 sessions operated by 39 organizations with more than 4,000 participants from over 60 countries, covering all aspects of current issues, including North Korea's nuclear threats, the new climate system after the Paris Agreement, the safety of nuclear energy, responses to terrorism, the startup ecosystem, and the electric car revolution. The twelfth forum in 2017 attempted to formulate a common vision for Asia's future. As Galtung theorized, the structure of peace must be broad in scope, with many types of exchange, not just economic, of a large domain, with more than two parties, and possess a superstructure, an annual conference or organizational framework for the system, like a permanent secretariat or rotating capitals. The Forum fulfills all three of these ideal elements of peacebuilding.

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